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Summary 
 
 In chapter 2 I analyzed the case against Nike, which can be described as abusive and 
exploitative conditions in factories. The June 1996 edition of Life Magazine featured an 
article about child labor, which revealed that Nike soccer balls were sowed by underage 
children in Pakistan. The cover had a picture of a 12 year old boy sowing Nike soccer balls. 
This child labor scandal turned out to be the tip of the iceberg. I wanted to show that the 
factories could justifiably be labelled as sweatshops. Workers were paid starvation wages. 
Excessive and forced overtime was a major problem in factories. Some workers were even 
subject to verbal and physical abuse by factory managers. These were the conditions workers 
faced at the time Nike established CSR as a function.  
         In chapter 3 my focus of analysis was civil society’s response to exploitative and 
abusive conditions in Nike factories. The child labor scandal in Pakistan spurred very strong 
reactions in the United States. Nike was subject to protests and boycotts from students and 
consumers. The press continued to criticize Nike for the conditions workers in its factory base 
faced. Some academics have also been highly critical of Nike. The anti-Nike movement was 
born at this time as a grassroots response to sweatshop conditions in Nike contracted factories. 
It includes intellectuals in that students have staged protests on campus and some professors 
have voiced moral support of the anti Nike movements. Anti-globalization critics chose Nike 
as a target because Nike is the biggest and most visible company of the sportswear industry. 
Nike`s initial response to sweatshop allegations was to decline responsibility for working 
conditions in the factory base on the basis that Nike did not own the factories. The child labor 
scandal in Pakistan, 1996, represented a turning point in because Nike was forced to accept 
responsibility for conditions in factories. 
         The subject of chapter 4 is an analysis of how Nike`s CSR strategy has developed since 
the child labor scandal to date. An important point was that Nike established CSR as a 
company function in response to activist pressure as a result of damaging information in the 
media. Hence, I found that Nike sees a PR case for CSR. Nike has divided the company’s 
history of corporate responsibility into three phases: The first phase (1996-2001) marked the 
establishment of CSR as a function. Nike claims that the second phase (2001-2006) was 
marked by social interaction, and that the third and current one (2006-2010) is marked by 
transformation. I have analyzed each one of these phases to put the searchlight on whether 
there has been any progress in terms of labor treatment as a result of Nike`s corporate 
responsibility initiatives.  
Nike`s factory base has been subject to extensive monitoring. This willingness to monitor 
compliance with, and hence enforce, Nike`s Code of Conduct did represent a progress in 
itself. It marked some progress that Nike was willing to cooperate with NGOs about corporate 
responsibility in factories. In 2003 Nike lost a lawsuit against a labor activist, Marc Kasky. 
The outcome was that Nike is required to tell the truth in all official communication when 
doing business in California. Kasky believes that the outcome encouraged Nike to promote 
some measures of corporate responsibility because Nike learned that the company has to tell 
the truth about practices in factories. In Nike`s last phase of corporate responsibility, Nike 
introduced the Management Verification Audits (MAVs), which are a thorough monitoring 
vehicle in order to understand causes of non-compliance issues in factories. My research 
found that these MAVs represented at least some progress because they at least indicated a 
willingness to get to the bottom of non-compliance issues. Nike has set ambitious targets by 
fiscal year 2011. The most important one is to eliminate excessive overtime in contract 
factories. The achievement of this goal is crucial for workers` well being in factories because 
excessive overtime has been a long standing and pressing issue in Nike`s factory base 
         In chapter 5 I analyzed the issue of wages in factories. Starvation wages has been a 
pressing problem in factories, and I wanted to investigate if there has been any progress as 
for this issue. My findings show that the progress has been limited in this area. Nike rejects 
the claim of its critics to ensure a living wage in factories. Nike`s response is that wages 
should be set according to the local minimum wage, or the prevailing industry wage, 
whichever is higher. My research indicates that the pressure for short term profit 
maximization has been, and is, the most pertinent cause of poverty wages. I found that there 
is indication of some progress when it comes to correction of the issue of non-payment or 
underpayment of the wages that the workers are due. If Nike accomplishes its goal to 
implement tailored Human Resource systems in all of its focus factories, that could be 
effective in addressing non-payment or underpayment of wages according to Nike`s wage 
standards. Nike`s corporate responsibility vision says that workers be invested in and treated 
as a commodity. Nike`s most important means to increase productivity, and hence wages, is 
that of lean manufacturing, which Nike believes to be of great promise for worker 
empowerment. However, research warns that there is no direct correlation between this 
method of production, better working conditions, and increased wages. Nevertheless, there is 
indication that lean production methods can result in better labor treatment, and increased 
wages in some factories with good management strategies. 
My final issue of investigation was monitoring of compliance with Nike`s Code of Conduct. I 
wanted to investigate if Nike`s system of monitoring of non-compliance issues has 
contributed to create any progress in factories. I analyzed the impact of Nike`s internal 
monitoring measures. My first subject of investigation was the SHAPE audits, which is a 
basic monitoring device performed by field production staff in factories. Then I analyzed the 
more thorough and elaborate MAV audits. Then I switched my investigation to the impact of 
Nike`s external monitoring (monitoring performed by organizations that Nike has cooperated 
with). Nike participated in a social, collaborative initiative called the Global Alliance for 
workers and communities. I investigated an analysis by the Thai Labour Campaign regarding 
the Global Compact’s research of factories in Thailand owned by the company Lian Thai. 
Nike participates in the initiative Fair Labor Association (FLA), which has a Code that is 
stricter that Nike`s initial Code. Nike committed to monitor and report compliance with the 
FLA`s Code. I analysed the impact of Nike`s cooperation with the FLA on the basis of FLA`s 
report from the period 08.01.2001-07.31.2002. Finally, there was a strike at the Kuk Dong 
factory. The factory was monitored by the organization Veritè. I analyzed the implications of 
Veritè`s findings in the light of the fact that the workers eventually won the right to have an 
independent union, which was one important progress.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction chapter 
I wake up every morning, jump in the shower, look down at the symbol (the Nike 
logo), and that pumps me up for the day. It’s to remind me every day what I have to 
do, which is “Just Do It 1  
The above quote illustrates how some individuals are devoted fans of Nike and its 
famous slogan, Just Do It. I describe in brief how Nike has developed and grown as a 
company: Nike was originally created in 1964 as a partnership between the late 
University of Oregon track coach Bill Bowerman and one of his students Phil Knight 
(Nike founder). The company was first called Blue Ribbon Sports (BRS). The initial 
idea was to manufacture production of running shoes in factories in Japan and sell them 
on the American market. In 1971, BRS changed the name to Nike, inspired by the 
Greek goddess of victory.2 Since 1971 Nike has grown from a U.S. based footwear 
distributor to the world’s most prominent marketer of athletic footwear, apparel and 
equipment. In the Fiscal Year ending May 2007, Nike’s earnings were $16, 3 billions, 
an increase of $ 1, 3 billion from the previous year.3  
         Two components have been instrumental in Nike’s growth: First, Nike has 
outsourced production to low cost countries, such as Vietnam, China and Indonesia. An 
important fact is that Nike does not own any of the factories that produce its items. 
Second, the core of Nike’s public relations strategy has been the sponsoring of world 
famous athletes, such as Michael Jordan, Tiger Woods and Lance Armstrong. Nike’s 
headquarters is located near Beaverton, Oregon. The company’s mission statement is 
“to bring inspiration and innovation to every athlete in the world”4.  Nike has its own 
understanding of what an athlete is, which is reflected in Bill Bowerman`s motto:” If 
you have a body, you’re an athlete.”5 This motto shows that Nike’s mission according 
to the company is to sell sports clothes, shoes and apparel to everyone who exercises. 
The “just do it”6 slogan captures that Nike always has marketed itself as a dynamic, 
trendy and innovative company.  
          Nike is surrounded by controversy. Anti-globalization activists have accused 
Nike of exploiting child labor and sweatshop conditions in factories. There is an 
organized and international anti-Nike movement that was at its peak from 1996-2001. 
                                                 
1 This is a quote by the internet entrepreneur Carmine Collettion, describing how he feels energized by 
the Nike logo tattooed on his navel. Naomi Klein, No Logo (Harper Perennial, 2000, Toronto): 52.   
2 These facts were found on http://www.nikebiz.com/company_overview/facts.html 
3 http://www.nikebiz.com/company_overview/facts.html 
4 For Nike’s presentation of what it stands for see http://www.nikebiz.com/company_overview 
5 http://www.nikebiz.com/company_overview 
6 http://www.nikebiz.com  
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The anti-Nike movement has been known for slogans such as “Nike – just don‘t do it”, 
as opposed to “Nike – just do it”7. It features prominent activists, like the author of the 
influential bestseller “No Logo” Naomi Klein and the director and activist Michael 
Moore. On the other hand, Nike supports several civil society organizations, ranging 
from important organisations and different collaborative social initiatives. I want to 
review in brief what organisations and initiatives Nike supports. Nike has endorsed the 
United Nations initiative Global Compact. The Global Compact is a voluntary initiative 
that was established by the United Nations. It is a framework for companies that 
comply to align business with ten universally accepted principles in the areas of human 
rights, labor, the environment and anti-corruption.8  
           Furthermore, Nike endorses the San Francisco based international organisation 
Business for Social Responsibility, which is a world leader within the field Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR), and works to make an impact on society as an 
“intermediary between business and civil society”9 The mission of Business for Social 
Responsibility is to “Build a more just and sustainable global economy by working with 
the business community.”10 Nike is a founding member of the Fair Labor Association 
(FLA), which is a collaborative social initiative designed to improve conditions in 
factories that sell items to multinational corporations. Companies that have joined the 
Fair Labor Association (FLA) have complied with a system of independent monitoring 
and verification to ensure that the Fair Labor Association’s (FLA) Workplace Standards 
are upheld.11 Nike does give corporate responsibility strategic priority. The company 
has published three corporate responsibility reports, its first in 2001, the second in 2004 
and the final one in 2006.12 What is clear is that Nike‘s corporate responsibility strategy 
has developed as a result of cooperative efforts between Nike and civil society 
organizations, such as Business for Social Responsibility. 
          The controversy surrounding Nike as the biggest company in the sportswear 
industry brings up the subject of my case study; the conditions that the worker in Nike’s 
global supply chain face. By “supply chain” I mean Nike’s factory base worldwide.  
                                                 
7 Klein, No Logo, p 354 
8  http://www.globalcompact.org/  
9  http://www.bsr.org  
10 Business for Social Responsibility Report 2007: Our role in designing a sustainable future  
    http://www.bsr.org/files/BSR-Report-2007.pdf 
11 http://www.fairlabor.org/  
12 The three reports are found on Nike’s website http://www.nikebiz.com/  
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I will investigate Nike’s corporate responsibility activities and initiatives with an eye 
for determining whether civil society has managed to reform Nike. Has Nike changed 
its behavior in accordance with the standards of social responsibility? Or has the 
linkage with civil society organizations provided an elaborate public relations cover for 
Nike? As Nike claims to be a responsible company, I want to research whether the 
workers that produce Nike gear are treated in a socially responsible manner in factories. 
My hypothesis is that while civil society, that is the press, the anti Nike movement and 
the corporate responsibility community, may have successfully lobbied for some 
betterment in factories, insufficient wages is the main obstacle in civil society’s bid to 
push for further improvements. Nike is the subject of my case study because the 
company has received enormous media attention, and because it is an interesting 
company as Nike’s treatment of workers divides proponents and critics of globalization. 
I chose to research Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as an idea because I 
sincerely believe that companies have a moral responsibility to behave ethically. I am 
passionate about CSR because I strongly believe that corporations should adapt to an 
excellent ethical conduct, not because that might pay, but because it is the right thing to 
do. Therefore I research how, and under what circumstances Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) can be successful in substantially improving conditions in 
factories, and hence change the lives of some humans in factories for the better. 
  
CSR as an Idea 
H.R. Bowen was the first scholar to formulate a doctrine about the social 
responsibilities of businesses. He may be considered the father of CSR as an idea. 
Bowen stated a Doctrine of Social Responsibility: 13 
The term Doctrine of Social Responsibility refers to the idea, now widely expressed, that 
voluntary assumption of social responsibility by businessmen is, or might be, a practicable 
means toward ameliorating economic problems and attaining more fully the economic 
goals we seek  
Professor Ramon Mullerat defines CSR as:  
a concept whereby companies voluntarily decide to respect and protect the interests of a 
broad range of stakeholders while contributing to a cleaner environment and a better 
society through an active interaction with all. CSR is the voluntary commitment by 
business to manage their roles in society in responsible ways 14 
                                                 
13 Howard R Bowen, The social responsibilities of businessmen,  
     (Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1953, New York): p. 6 
14 Ramon Mullerat, The global responsibility of business Corporate Social Responsibility the  
Corporate governance of the 21st century, edited by Ramon Mullerat (The Hague: Kluwer, 
International Bar Association Series, 2005):1-17. 
 4
CSR is a new concept. There are many different definitions. My research is based upon 
the Doctrine of Social Responsibility as well as Mullerat`s definition above. I use 
Bowen`s Doctrine because it was the first doctrine about corporate responsibility. 
Mullerat`s definition complements the Doctrine of Social Responsibility because it 
gives a more timely description of the role of CSR in today’s business environment. An 
important point is that there is no universally agreed upon paradigm of what CSR is, or 
how CSR should be carried out. More importantly, there is no agreement about whether 
CSR can be effective or not. Although left of center scholars embrace the idea of 
corporate responsibility, they tend to be skeptical of the possibilities to change 
corporate behavior through CSR, as they believe that CSR mostly serves the purpose of 
window dressing. My analysis of how CSR plays out in reality in Nike`s factory base 
will shed light upon to what extent the skeptics are right.  
         I want to clarify that is optional to have a CSR strategy at all. A corporation may 
choose to increase profits, follow the law and social norms, and otherwise have no CSR 
measures. If a policy that previously was voluntary is made into a mandatory, legally 
binding standard, complying with the standard is following the law, not CSR. The 
article “Filling the empty shell: The public debate on CSR in Austria as a paradigmatic 
example of a political issue”15 illustrates how the question of what should be CSR and 
what should be binding legal standards can be very divisive. The employer led 
organization CSR Austria wants to continue to structure the social responsibilities of 
business around voluntary measures. However, unions want legal minimum standards. 
The debate is about what companies should be legally obliged to do, and what should 
continue to be optional measures, and hence qualify as CSR.  
         Corporate responsibility is a very timely idea when it comes to environmental 
issues because the issue of global warming is high on the political agenda. There are 
ethical challenges related to corporate responsibility and the issue of climate. The 
production of bio diesel has increased as a result of increased corporate demand. 
Problem being, production of bio diesel has been listed as one of the causes of the food 
crisis that occurred this spring. How can corporate behavior be environmentally and 
socially sustainable? Outsourcing to growing economies, like China and India, happens 
to a larger extent and at a faster pace than ever before. That puts labor treatment in 
factories on the agenda in academia, politically and economically. Scandals, such as 
                                                 
15 Bernhard Mark-Ungericht and Richard Weiskopf, Filling the empty shell: the public debate on CSR in 
Austria as a paradigmatic example of a political issue, Journal of Business Ethics 70 (2007) p. 285-297   
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child labor or blatant abuses of workers, receive media attention when they occur, and 
may be psychologically damaging for the guilty company.  
        There was a big CSR conference in Oslo in March, 2007, that featured Kofi Annan 
and the previous Nobel Peace Price winner Mohammad Yonus. The Telenor issue 
where under aged laborers were found in production, and two persons died in work 
related accidents in one of Telenor‘s daughter companies in Bangladesh shows that 
violations of workers‘rights continue to be an important aspect of corporate 
responsibility. The quote below by the CEO of Business for Social Responsibility Aron 
Cramer illustrates how vital and timely CSR is in today’s world: “The world is 
seemingly paying more attention to corporate responsibility than at any time in recent 
memory. It is our collective challenge to capture this opportunity.”16  
 
Why the CSR Community Should Embrace the Idea of the Triple Bottom Line  
Even if there is disagreement about what CSR should embrace exactly, I argue in favor 
of a Triple Bottom Line paradigm as a foundation of what exactly CSR should 
constitute. In the article Getting to the bottom of “Triple Bottom Line” Wayne Norman 
and Chris Mac Donald17 analyze the triple bottom line paradigm. The idea behind the 
triple bottom line is that a corporation’s ultimate success or health can and should be 
measured not just by the hard core financial bottom line, but also by its social and 
environmental performance. This means that supporters of the Triple Bottom Line 
believe that a corporation’s performance should be measured toward two additional 
bottom lines: one of social behavior and one of environmental behavior. The Triple 
Bottom Line paradigm of CSR assumes collection of tangible data in order to measure 
how companies perform socially, environmentally and financially:  
The components of “social performance” or “social impact” can be measured in relatively 
objective ways on the basis of standard indicators. These data can be audited and 
reported.18 A social “bottom line” – that is, something analogous to a net social 
“profit/loss” – can be calculated using data from these indicators and a relatively 
uncontroversial formula that could be used for any firm19 
                                                 
16 Business for Social Responsibility, Our role in designing a sustainable future, (2007): p 22 
17 Chris Mac Donald, Wayne Norman, “Getting to the bottom of “triple bottom line” (pre-publication 
version March 2003) p.1-19, published version found in Journal of Business Ethics Quarterly (2004) 
http://www.businessethics.ca/3bl/triple_bottom_line_abstract.html 
18 Mac Donald, Norman, Getting to the bottom of “ triple bottom line”, p. 3 
19 Mac Donald, Norman, Getting to the bottom of “ triple bottom line”, p. 4 
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Supporters of the triple bottom line assume a link between measurement and social 
performance: “Measuring social performance helps improve social performance, and 
firms with better social performance tend to be more profitable in the long-run.”20 
The idea of a triple bottom line has been subject to criticism. One criticism expressed 
by the authors of Getting to the bottom of “triple bottom line” is that the standards that 
constitute a social bottom line and an environmental bottom line may be vague. 
However, I argue in favor of a triple bottom line which at least constitutes basic social 
and environmental standards that everyone who favors corporate responsibility will 
endorse. There is universal agreement within the CSR community that the use of child 
labor is wrong. Furthermore, there is universal agreement that working conditions in 
factories should not be hazardous for the workers’ health and safety. My stand is that 
the triple bottom line as a benchmark of corporate responsibility should include the 
principles of the Global Compact initiative. Each one of the ten principles regarding 
human rights, labor, the environment and anti-corruption is universally accepted. The 
standards are tangible as well, which serves the need of data that can be counted and 
measured.  
         Below I discuss why the purpose of the Global Compact is compatible with the 
Triple Bottom Line. This is how the Global Compact sees its purpose: “As the world’s 
largest, global corporate citizenship initiative, the Global Compact is first and foremost 
concerned with exhibiting and building the social legitimacy of business and 
markets.”21. If all corporations demonstrated a record of environmentally and socially 
sustainable business practices that would most certainly improve the social legitimacy 
of companies, which would benefit humanity. Nike claims that its goal is to integrate 
the Triple Bottom Line of corporate responsibility into all aspects of the company`s 
business. The success of the Triple Bottom Line depends on the willingness of 
companies to integrate CSR into their core business. Therefore I research how and 
under what circumstances the triple bottom line understanding of CSR can create 
needed improvements in factories, and hence change the lives of workers who truly 
need their jobs in Nike‘s factory base. 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Mac Donald, Norman, Getting to the bottom of “ triple bottom line”, p. 4 
21 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/  
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Nike & the Sweatshop 
My research needs a definition of sweatshops because I argue that the sweatshop 
allegations by the anti Nike movement in the 1990s were legitimate. I investigate to 
what extent labor treatment in Nike contracted  factories has improved from sweatshop 
conditions at the time Nike established corporate responsibility as a company function. 
The non-governmental organization Sweat Shop Watch tells us that a sweatshop is: 
“A workplace that violates the law and where workers are subject to: 
 -Extreme exploitation, including the absence of a living wage or long work hours,  
- Poor working conditions, such as health and safety hazards, 
- Arbitrary discipline, such as verbal or physical abuse, or 
- Fear and intimidation when they speak out, organize,  
   or attempt to form a union.” 22          
        The sweatshop issue raises controversies. In a New York Times article with the 
provocative headline “Let them sweat”23 Nicholas D Kristof argues that we should buy 
products made in sweatshops because those who work in sweatshops want us to, given  
that sweatshop labor is the best option they have. Furthermore, he argues that 
sweatshops can represent a step in the right direction towards economic growth and 
greater stability in developing countries. Kristof even claims that well meaning anti 
sweatshop activists sometimes have done more harm than good, because boycotts tend 
to result in layoffs of workers. However, I argue that the efforts of the anti Nike 
movement have been instrumental in the progress that has occurred in Nike‘s factory 
base as a result of CSR as a function.  
         My position on sweatshops is that humans in developing countries deserve 
dignity, not semi slavery. However, this stand raises a difficult question: It is a 
legitimate assumption that those who work in sweatshops want to keep their jobs 
merely because they lack better options. But how can the CSR community and civil 
society together push for betterment for those who work under the most horrendous, 
abusive and exploitative sweatshop conditions, without depriving them of the best 
option they have? Easy answers are elusive when it comes to globalization. However, 
my study of how Nike‘s approach to corporate responsibility and the company’s CSR 
measures have developed as a result of public pressure will aim to find some possible 
answers to this question. I believe it is important for the legitimacy and credibility of 
                                                 
22 The definition is found on http://www.sweatshopwatch.org 
23 Nicholas D Kristof, Let them sweat, New York Times, June 25, 2002 
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CSR and the idea of a social bottom line to research this question. Successful measures 
in factories caused by the CSR movement with the support of civil society could change 
the lives of millions of workers who belong to the supply chains of multinational 
corporations. With this in mind, I proceed with the theoretical foundation of my case 
study, which essentially is about the potential and the challenges CSR faces as an idea.  
 
An Institutional Theory of CSR  
John Campbell has developed an institutional theory of CSR. He has identified a set of 
propositions that analyze under what conditions corporations are likely to behave 
responsibly. Campbell argues that institutional conditions affect the relationship 
between economic conditions and corporate conduct. His theory discusses how the 
following institutional conditions impact corporate behavior: public and private 
regulation, independent monitoring, institutionalized norms, associative behavior 
among corporations and organized dialogues among corporations and stakeholders.24 I 
chose Campbell’s Institutional Theory because it makes an important new contribution 
to the CSR literature. I describe what the contributions are and how they will prove 
useful for my analysis.     
         The first contribution is that Campbell provides a minimum standard for 
responsible corporate behavior. The standard defines a behavioral threshold, below 
which corporations would be understood to act unethically. This is the definition: 
I view corporations as acting in socially responsible ways if they do two things. First, 
they must not knowingly do anything that could harm their stakeholders – notably, 
their investors, employees, customers, suppliers, or the local community within which 
they operate. Second, if corporations do cause harm to their stakeholders, they must 
rectify it whenever the harm is discovered and brought to their attention25  
I agree that corporations who knowingly cause harm without rectifying it act 
unethically. I will use this definition as a benchmark to analyze whether Nike shows the 
minimum level of responsibility that may reasonably be expected.  
         Another important contribution is that the theory brings something new to the 
CSR literature because it helps move CSR as an idea in a more theoretically oriented 
direction. It does so by offering an institutional theory that identifies responsible 
corporate behavior. This gives me a framework in order to analyze the potential of CSR 
to bring about improvement in the case of Nike. Are the institutional conditions that 
                                                 
24 John L Campbell. “Why would corporations behave in socially responsibly ways? An institutional 
theory of corporate social responsibility” Academy of Management Review (2007) 946-967  
25 Campbell, Why would corporations behave in socially responsibly ways? An institutional theory of 
corporate social responsibility, p. 951. 
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encourage decent conduct present in Nike’s case? This framework will prove useful in 
my discussion of obstacles in the way of progress through CSR. I am interested in how 
the absence of institutional conditions that encourage responsible behavior affects the 
possibilities of CSR to create needed change in factories? On the other hand, I base my 
treatment of the potential of CSR to create progress and social betterment in factories 
on Campbell’s proposition number five which states that:  
Corporations will be more likely to act in socially responsible ways if there are 
private, independent organizations, including NGOs, social movement 
organizations, institutional investors, and the press, in their environment who 
monitor their behavior, and when necessary, mobilize to change it.26  
This is an important proposition for my analysis of Nike`s collaboration with civil 
society organizations. Factories have been subject to extensive monitoring by Nike as 
well as by NGOs. Furthermore, this proposition has a wider scope than official 
monitoring of contractors’ compliance with Nike‘s Code of Conduct, because it 
includes public scrutiny of corporate behavior by the press and NGOs. Therefore I want 
to use it as a foundation of my analysis of the anti Nike movement’s critical scrutiny of 
Nike`s labor treatment in factories. Moreover, this proposition implies that independent 
monitoring of the behavior of contractor companies that own the factories of Nike‘s 
base will make contractors, and hence factory owners, more inclined to treat workers  
better. I use it as a grounding to analyze whether independent monitoring has resulted in 
any betterment for Nike`s worker population. 
         I use Campbell’s institutional theory critically in order to defend my hypothesis 
that poverty-level wages is the main challenge for the success of CSR in factories. It is 
my belief that starvation wages has been the most serious problem in factories to date. 
Therefore I discuss why insufficient wages has been such a persistent social problem. 
Nike does not see a business case that favors a living wage because there is no proof 
that increased wages improve productivity, and hence contribute to increased profits.  
I proceed to discuss how Nike‘s rejection of the claim to provide a living wage affects 
the wage aspect of CSR in Nike‘s global chain of factories.  
My research assumes a correlation between unhealthy economic environments in 
developing countries and starvation wages because workers who come from a 
background of poverty lack better options. Campbell’s first proposition about economic 
conditions states that healthy economic environments decrease the probability of 
                                                 
26 Campbell, Why would corporations behave in socially responsibly ways? An institutional theory of 
corporate social responsibility, p. 958. 
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socially responsible behavior.27 Countries that represent important markets for 
outsourcing in the apparel industry, such as China and Indonesia have unhealthy 
economies with a high number of people living below the poverty line, which is to say 
that companies can get away with paying starvation wages. I have now explained how 
my research uses the institutional theory of CSR. 
 
The Multilevel Theory of CSR 
This is theory provides an important analytical foundation in order to explain why 
companies embrace CSR initiatives.28 Hence, the theory assumes that corporations 
exhibit the potential of CSR to create positive social change. The Multilevel Theory 
argues that corporations are under pressure to prioritize CSR by a number of different 
actors. Each actor is driven by motives that belong to one or more of three categories: 
instrumental, relational or moral. Furthermore, the theory analyzes the motives for CSR 
at multiple levels of analysis: the individual, the organizational, the national and the 
trans national level  
         I wanted one theory that focuses on how positive changes can happen by applying 
CSR. The Multilevel Theory serves that purpose because it focuses on how the motives 
of actors on different levels that can push corporations to engage in social change 
through CSR. Furthermore, I chose the Multilevel Theory because it brings several new 
contributions to CSR theory. The authors show how the multilevel theory brings the 
field of organizational justice into the CSR literature. This field has a lot to offer CSR 
as it “allows for a more socially centered treatment of CSR, as opposed to the more 
economic approach often taken.”29 Second, the multilevel theory uses multiple needs 
theory as a framework within the field of organizational justice. Multiple needs open for 
considerations of moral obligations. That lays a foundation for a study of how a 
network of factors may “lead organizations to be more socially responsible and, if 
successful, to impact social change.”30 Finally, the multilevel theory differs from other 
CSR theories as it considers the antecedents of CSR. In the authors ‘words “we 
                                                 
27 Campbell, Why would corporations behave in socially responsibly ways? An institutional theory of 
corporate social responsibility, p.947 
28 Ruth V Aguilera, Deborah E Rupp and Cynthia A Williams, “Putting the S back in corporate social 
responsibility: a multilevel theory of social change in organizations”, Academy of Management Review 
(2007): p.836-863. 
29 Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, Putting the S back in corporate social responsibility: a multilevel theory of 
social change in organizations: p.839. 
30 Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, Putting the S back in corporate social responsibility: a multilevel theory of 
social change in organizations: p.839 
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examine the factors that might lead various actors at various levels of analysis to push 
firms to engage in CSR”31 I appreciate the multilevel theory’s contribution to move 
CSR as a field from a more narrow financial orientation toward an enhanced focus on 
the people aspect of CSR.  
         I chose three propositions in Multilevel Theory in order to follow up my main 
question about the potential contributions of CSR to improve conditions in Nike 
factories. The first proposition, (Proposition 2a) deals with how the motives of internal 
and external stakeholders can interlink and together push for CSR: “Internal and 
external organizational actors‘(shareholders‘, managers‘, consumers‘) shareholder 
interests, stakeholder interests, and stewardship interests will lead them to push firms to 
engage in social change through CSR” 32 This proposition is useful in two respects: 
First, it is useful in order to analyze whether the interlinking motives of important 
internal actors, such as managers, and important external actors, such as the press, have 
pushed for improvements. Second, it is useful in order to analyze whether interlinking 
of motives may continue to push for improvement.  
         The second proposition I consider is based upon motives among insider 
organizational actors: “A downward hierarchical ordering of motives among insider 
organizational actors will lead to stronger pressure on firms to engage in social change 
through CSR.”33The authors argue that although multiple motives may push for CSR, 
there is a hierarchy of motives within corporations. On top are the instrumental motives, 
to use CSR as a means to increase profits. By “downward” the authors mean that CEOs 
and executives prioritize CSR as a “top down” means to increase revenues all the way 
down the business chain. I will analyze if “a downward hierarchical ordering of 
motives” among prominent actors inside Nike have contributed to push for the changes 
that have happened to the labor area of Nike’s CSR practices. 34  
Then I proceed to analyze to what extent the motives of Nike executives may contribute 
to future improvements in factories. The final proposition I intend to use argues that: 
“An upward hierarchical ordering of motives among outsider organizational actors (i.e. 
consumers) will lead to stronger pressure on firms to engage in social change through 
                                                 
31 Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, Putting the S back in corporate social responsibility: a multilevel theory of 
social change in organizations: p.839 
32 Aguilera, Rupp, Williams: p.847 
33 Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, Putting the S back in corporate social responsibility: a multilevel theory of 
social change in organizations: p.848 
34 Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, Putting the S back in corporate social responsibility: a multilevel theory of 
social change in organizations: p.848 
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CSR.”35 By “upward hierarchical ordering of motives” the authors mean that actors on 
the outside, such as consumers, the press, activists or NGOs, work to influence top 
executives to improve conditions at the bottom, such as in sweatshops. The main 
motives will be moral, followed by relational motives and, at the bottom of the 
hierarchy, instrumental motives. I want to analyse whether such an “upward hierarchy” 
of motives by outsider actors that belong to civil society has contributed to the 
improvements that have happened in factories that produce Nike items.  
 
Combining the Institutional Theory and the Multilevel Theory    
The Institutional Theory and the Multilevel Theory complement each other nicely for 
my research purpose. The Institutional Theory provides an excellent framework for 
critique of Nike’s labor practices. It may be argued that Nike in the past has cynically 
taken advantage of conditions in developing countries that discourage ethical treatment 
of workers. Moreover, globalization critics are inclined to argue that Nike continues to 
take advantage of conditions that permit exploitative behavior in developing countries. 
The Multilevel Theory balances my criticism of Nike’s CSR practices in that it is 
inherently positive of the possibility of CSR to create progress and social betterment. 
Moreover, the Multilevel Theory gives my research a more people minded foundation 
in that it deals with how the motives of people inside and outside business organizations 
can push for changes that affect people on the bottom of the chain of corporations 
 
                                                 
35 Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, Putting the S back in corporate social responsibility: a multilevel theory of 
social change in organizations: p. 848 
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Chapter 2 The Case Against Nike 
This chapter discusses the case against Nike, based upon information about sweatshop 
conditions in factories presented to the public from 1996-2001. That period represents 
the peak years of damaging information about abusive and exploitative conditions in 
Nike`s factory base. According to Naomi Klein, Nike’s sweatshop scandals had been 
the subject of more than 1,500 opinion columns and news articles in 1999.36 Nike has 
certainly received enormous attention by the press, NGOs and academics, due to the 
size, visibility and popularity of its brand. This analysis of Nike’s poor labor treatment 
in the past lays a background for my analysis of civil society`s success in lobbying for 
betterment. My analysis of how workers were treated during the peak years of 
damaging information helps understand why Nike was subject to intense criticism and 
public scrutiny because of the conditions of its factory base.  
 
Nike’s Past Record of Sweatshop Conditions in Factories 
 
I argue that Nike used sweatshop labor in the past, based upon Sweatshop Watch`s 
definition, which tells us that a sweatshop is a factory that violates the law and where 
workers are subject to extreme exploitation, poor working conditions, arbitrary 
discipline and fear and intimidation.37 As for the first criterion “Extreme exploitation, 
including the absence of a living wage or long work hours” 38, Nike has been subject to 
child labor scandals in the past. Moreover, my research shows that poverty-level has 
been a long standing problem in Nike contracted factories. When it comes to the second 
criterion:”Poor working conditions, such as health and safety hazards” 39 the work in 
factories has been dangerous because Nike has not shown the proper concern for the 
workers` health and safety in the past. Furthermore, workers in Nike`s factory base 
have been subject to verbal and sometimes physical abuse, which fits with Sweatshop 
Watch`s third criterion:”Arbitrary discipline, such as verbal or physical abuse” 40. 
Finally, union leaders and supporters have experienced “Fear and intimidation when 
they speak out, organize, or attempt to form a union.”41 My research shows that each 
one of the four criteria that define a sweatshop have been present in Nike`s factory 
base. Nike has been subject to countless allegitions on the Internet. Some of them are 
                                                 
36 Klein, No Logo, p.366 
37 http://www.sweatshopwatch.org   
38 http://www.sweatshopwatch.org  
39 http://www.sweatshopwatch.org  
40 http://www.sweatshopwatch.org  
41 http://www.sweatshopwatch.org  
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true, some of them may not be. My research is based upon the proven findings of 
professors, reporters and reliable, independent NGOs against Nike are legitimate, which 
serves as valid proof that Nike has a poor past record in factories. This implies that 
Nike’s release of its first Corporate Responsibility report in 2001, (marking the 
beginning of Nike’s CSR History), was a publicity tool to combat information about 
exploitative and abusive working conditions.   
 
Child Labor   
 
The photo on the cover of the June 1996 issue of Life magazine showed a heartbreaking 
picture of Tariq, a 12 year old boy stitching together a Nike soccer ball in a Pakistani 
factory. The picture was related to an article about child labor in Pakistan.  Nike 
actually admitted to mistakes about child labor in its first Corporate Responsibility  
Report released in 2001, saying that: “The child labor issue is full of challenges and 
surprises. By far our worst experience and biggest mistake was in Pakistan, where we 
blew it.”42 However, Phil Knight, Nike’s founder tried to convince Nike's critics that he 
and Nike were against child labor and that the use of child labor had only ever 
happened by accident:  
Children should study and go to school. We do everything we can to ensure that 
happens. Setting the highest age standards in the industry, and requiring independent 
certification that factories meet those standards, is our best practice to make it so43  
 
But did the child labor scandal in Pakistan merely happen by accident? Although 
Knight claimed to support children`s rights, the Life magazine article that revealed 
child labor in Nike factories in Pakistan, and especially the picture of a 12 year old on 
the cover turned out to be psychologically damaging to Nike’s public reputation. Nike 
did not appreciate that shortly after the article was published; activists all across Canada 
and the U.S. were standing in front of Nike outlets, holding up the photo of Tariq. A 
professor of the University of Michigan, Eric Lorrand criticizes Nike for the fact that 
their headquarters started production in Pakistan (which he points out to be a notorious 
country for child labor) with no measures whatsoever to monitor hiring practices by 
Nike contractors. Lorrand a has published questions and answers focused on Nike’s 
poor record as for labor treatment in factories on his homepage,44 which illustrates how 
                                                 
42 Nike’s Corporate Responsibility Report Fiscal Year 2001 p. 37 
http://www.nikeresponsibility.com/pdfs/color/Nike_FY01_CR_report.pdf  
43 Nike (2001): p.38 
44 http://www.personal.umich.edu/~lormand/poli/nike/nike101-1.htm 
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the fact that Nike items were made by children provoked academics. Facts about child 
labor in Asia, dated 1996, presented by the International Labor Office state that:  
Among the 40 million children aged 5-14 years in Pakistan 1996, 3.3 million, i.e. 8.3 
per cent, were economically active. Medical equipment and carpets continue to be 
produced by children in Pakistan. 45 The numbers above confirm that Pakistan is 
notorious for child labor. These facts about Pakistan`s child labor record at the time of 
the Life article confirm Lorrand`s point that it was morally questionable of Nike to start 
production there. 
         The activist organization Campaign for Labor Rights has criticized Nike for its 
child labor sins in Pakistan. The website of Campaign for Labor Rights quotes Max 
White of Justice: Do It Nike (the latter is a coalition that has worked for improvements 
of labor treatment in Nike contracted factories):” 
Nike went into Pakistan, knowing full well that child labor is an ages-old practice 
there and taking no precautions whatsoever to prevent the use of child labor in the 
production of its soccer balls. We have to conclude that Nike expected to profit from 
its Pakistani contractors' known usage of bonded child labor.46  
 
It is a valid point that Nike entered Pakistan without taking precautions against the use 
of child labor. We will probably never know if Nike actually calculated how much it 
could expect to profit from contractors` use of bonded child labor, or if Nike simply did 
not care that contractors sometimes employed under aged children. Nevertheless, it is 
legitimate to conclude that the child labor scandal in Pakistan was not just an 
unfortunate accident. I do not trust Phil Knight to truly be against child labor 
    
Low Wages 
 
I start this section with an analysis of the wage levels in Nike`s Indonesian factories. 
Indonesia has been an important country in Nike’s outsourcing strategy due to the access of 
cheap labor. By 1996 1/3 of Nike’s shoes were produced there. Executives have claimed 
that Nike’s presence in Indonesia has benefited the whole country. In 1994 Nike 
released the following statement:  
As a player in Indonesia's economy, Nike is part of a plan that has succeeded in 
increasing per capita income ten-fold since 1970 while decreasing those living in 
poverty from 60% to 15% in the same period.... By supporting light manufacturing, 
Nike contributes to the increase of workers' skills, wages and capabilities.47 
 
                                                 
45 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.DOWNLOAD_BLOB?Var_DocumentID=6192 
46 http://www.clrlabor.org/alerts/1998/soccer_balls.html 
47 Peter Hancock, The walking ghosts of West Java by Peter Hancock,  
    Inside Indonesia no 51, July-September 1997 
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Peter Hancock, a scholar who researched Nike factories in Indonesia from July 1996 
until June 1997 argues that Nike’s statement is questionable. First, Nike did not start 
full production in Indonesia until 1988. Second, Hencock claims that Nike`s quote is 
propaganda and manipulation of government statistics. His study of two Indonesian 
factories gives evidence that women received wages that would keep them in poverty. 
In The walking ghosts of West Java Hencock describes how one woman who had 
worked for six months sowing Nike shoes and sportswear only received Rp 3,700 per 
day, which was below the legal regional wage of Rp 5,200 per day.48 The woman’s 
comment was that because she, unlike most of her friends, did not work seven days a 
week, she was not entitled to Indonesia’s legal daily wage. Hancock refers to another 
worker he interviewed who was left in poverty when she had to leave the Nike factory 
after 2 years of labor because of a severe knee injury. The factory did not grant her sick 
pay or compensation for a permanent disability. This is astory”extreme exploitation” 
Three years after Hancock’s initial research; he revisited the two factories of his case 
study in Indonesia, arguing that “these women were all piecemeal workers earning very 
poor wages in a sector renowned for exploitative practices.”49  
      The research paper Strategic Public Relations, Sweatshops and the Making of a 
Global Movement by  B.G. Bullert makes some remarks about how Indonesian 
workers` (to a large extent women) have objected to Nike’s exploitatively low wages:  
In 1992, the minimum wage in Indonesia ranged from 50 cents a day to $1.50 a day. A 
survey carried out in 1989 by the Asian-American Free Labor Institute found that 56 % 
of the companies were paying less than the Indonesian minimum wage. Subcontractors at 
Nike factories would avoid paying the minimum wage by keeping them at the training 
wage level for months or years at a time. Employees objected with their feet. According 
to the Indonesian government’s own figures, there were 190 strikes in 1992, up from 130 
in 1991 and 60 in 1990.50 
The workers` strikes as a response to how Nike avoided paying the legal minimum 
wage shows that there was a limit to the “extreme exploitation” poor workers in 
Indonesia would accept. The fact that poor women in Indonesia, a developing country, 
went on strike as a protest against the factories wages, may be interpreted as a reliable 
sign that Nike has a record of “extreme exploitation”.   
  
 
                                                 
48 Hancock, The Walking Ghosts of West Java 
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I turn to wages in factories in China that produce Nike items. China had been 
established as the most important market for production of Nike items prior to the peak 
years of bad publicity, 1996-2001. Estimates by the U.S. National Labor Committee 
(NLC) assume that Nike outsourced production to 50 contractors in China, employing 
more than 110,000 workers, in 2000.51 Factories that produced shoes and sportswear for 
Nike in South Korea actually relocated to China due to lower costs of labor. An 
example is the Korean owned factory Sewon that left South Korea in 1989, relocating 
to greener pastures. In South Korea, 1989, a footwear worker earned $600 U.S. a 
month, for six day, 55½-hour workweeks Sewon's direct labor costs in China were less 
than 9 percent of those in South Korea.52 These are the statistics of the Sewon/Nike 
Wage after one year, including a  fully loaded wage, all incentives, overtime and 
bonuses: 26 cents an hour, which would be $2.31 a day, for a 9-hour day, constituting 
$12.51 a week (for a 5½-day, 49-hour workweek), 54.22 a month, $650.60 a year, 
which equals less than $ 2 a day.53 Although costs of living in China are significantly 
lower than in the U.S., these wages were so low that the workers could not be free from 
a life in poverty. The independent human rights organization Hong Kong Christian 
Industrial Committee carried out research on Nike’s production in China between 
November 1999 and April 2000. The findings were the following: During the busy 
season, workers had to work 15-hour shifts, from 7:30 a.m. to 10:30 p.m., seven days a 
week; sometimes working all night. The average wage was 22 cents an hour. The 
workers were paid 12 cent premium for overtime hours. A 7-day, 83, 5 hour workweek 
paid nothing more than $ 18, 06 a week.54 These wages are at a subsistence level, in 
that workers did not die from starvation. Although workers survive on those wages, 
they were insufficient to provide a decent quality of life. 
         The report Worker Rights in the Americas?: a Rare inside Glimpse released in 
May 2001 by the National Labor Committee (NLC) is a unique, previously suppressed 
USAID-funded investigation. This research documents systematic repression of human 
and worker rights in El Salvador, government complicity and corruption. The reports 
concluded that eighty-five thousand maquila workers, mostly young women, who 
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sowed garments for Nike, among other large corporations, such as Gap and Wal-Mart 
were “systematically denied their rights and paid wages of “abject poverty.”55  
This raport shows an evident correlation between excessive production goals and 
financial exploitation. At the Hermosa factory two lines each had to complete 1,500 
Nike T-shirts per day. Workers were paid according to how many pieces they sowed. 
An example of how this was carried out is that women who specialized in attaching the 
sleeves to Nike T-shirts had to sew 2,000 sleeves in the 8.5 hour shift. Otherwise, they 
would neither meet their quota nor earn the minimum wage of $4.80 a day. Hence, she 
was required to sew 235 sleeves an hour or one every 15.3 seconds, non-stop all day. 
This equalled as little as 11.5 cents for every bundle of 48 sleeves. This would be the 
equivalent of 0023958 cents for each operation. If the daily 2,000 sleeve quota was 
achieved, the women were paid an additional incentive of 11 and four-tenths cents for 
every bundle of 48 sleeves exceeding the regular 2000-piece goal.56  
Dangerous Working Conditions  
The Hermosa factory did have a medical clinic. However, workers complained about 
lack of available medicines at the factory clinic. The workers felt that this poorly 
equipped factory clinic existed as a tool to deny them time off needed to access the by 
far more comprehensive health care available at the state Social Security clinics and 
hospitals. I should add that workers paid for access to the government’s Social Security 
health system through deductions in their pay checks. Workers who sowed Nike 
apparel at another factory in El Salvador, the Chi Fung Factory, who had to go to a 
public hospital for comprehensive care, were docked for missed working hours as they 
were required to”replace" those hours by working overtime without pay. This qualifies 
as “extreme exploitation” as well as a callous lack of concern for the health of workers 
with medical conditions.  According to the National Labor Committee’s report about 
Worker Rights in the Americas the drinking water accessible the workers at the 
Hermosa factory was so filthy and unsafe that the bacteria levels exceeded international 
standards by 4,290 %!57 This water contained human and animal fecal matter. Drinking 
it could cause severe respiratory, urinary tract, eye, ear and stomach infections. It was 
not even safe to wash with. The National Labor Committee, with the help of workers, 
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tested the drinking water in the Chi Fung factory. The finding was that bacteria levels 
were 290 times greater than the internationally allowed standards. The water contained 
evidence of fecal contamination, likely due to animal run-off in the factory’s well.58  
Abusive Working Conditions 
Women seeking employment at Nike`s Chi Fung factory in El Salvador were required 
to first undergo a urine analysis/pregnancy test at a medical laboratory and present the 
results. If a woman was tested positive, she was not hired. All female employees were 
forced to go through another pregnancy test at the Chi Fung`s factory clinic fourteen 
days after they started work. Two to three days’ wages, 125 colones ($14.29) were 
deducted from the women’s’ pay. If a woman tested pregnant, she was immediately 
fired. These practices represented an unconstitutional discrimination of women 
according to the Salvadoran Constitution, Article 3. 59  In September 2000, video 
surveillance cameras were installed in the Hermosa factory, pointed directly at the 
production lines as a means to pressure the workers. By this line supervisors could 
direct supervisors to yell at women who did not work fast enough, order them to work 
faster, or to stop workers from talking during working hours. The women felt it 
humiliating to be watched constantly. Workers in all factories producing for Nike who 
were interviewed for the research of the Workers` rights in Central America report 
complained about abusive treatment by supervisors who yelled and screamed at them to 
work faster. The supervisors yelled that "there are urgent orders to fulfil" and that the 
workers shouldn’t be just "looking at the pieces or caressing them" but flying through 
the work.”60   
         In October 1996, the CBS News program 48 Hours ran a series that documented 
abuses of workers in Vietnamese factories.61 The CBS reported that on the International 
Women’s Day March 8, 1996, 56 women in a Vietnamese factory were forced to run a 
distance of 4km around the factory grounds. 12 of them fainted and were taken to the 
hospital. The women’s offence was that a few of them had worn outdoor shoes inside 
the factory. Unfortunately, this 48 Hours series about abuses of workers in Vietnamese 
factories is no longer available to the public. Nevertheless, I trust this to be a true story 
as it was documented on national television.  
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60 NLC, Worker Rights in the Americas, May 2001 
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The columnist Bob Herbert’s article Brutality in Vietnam says that Nike`s 
spokeswoman at the time of this event labeled the event as “absolutely horrible.”62 This 
is evidence that Nike acknowledged that the event took place. Nonetheless, some of 
Nike`s critics believed Nike only found the abuse horrible because it was presented to 
the public. Furthermore, my review of the story draws on descriptions of conditions in 
Vietnamese factories by Thuyen Nguyen, a representative of the Vietnam Labor Watch, 
which is a labor rights groups formed by Vietnamese Americans as a response to 
information about abuses in Nike`s Vietnamese factories as seen on 48 hours in 1996.63 
The fact that the Vietnam Labor Watch was founded as a response to a series about 
abuses in factories on national television is an example of how media attention to 
horrible labor treatment in factories triggered organized activist pressure against Nike`s 
labor practices. Thuyen Nguyen wrote a report based upon his research of conditions in 
Vietnamese factories in 1997.64 Although Nguyen`s report would have been of interest 
to my research in this chapter it is unfortunately no longer available on line.  
 
Harassment of Workers who Tried to Form Unions 
Workers in Nike factories in El Salvador were told repeatedly by management that a 
"trade union in the factory is not necessary" because the company "gives you incentives 
and all the social benefits according to the law." The workers were very clear that "The 
management is very strict and will never allow a union." (Worker Rights in the 
Americas: A Rare Inside Glimpse). Complete Denial of freedom of association was a 
major problem in factories in El Salvador, actually an anti-union policy was found, by 
which attempts at organization were repressed. Union leaders interviewed said it was 
very common for supervisors and chiefs of personnel to threaten workers with firings if 
belonging to or attempting to form a union. The names of workers who belonged to or 
at some point had belonged to a union organization were “blacklisted” by the 
management. The workers affirmed that the people who appear on these lists are not 
hired by similar contractor companies. This violated the Freedom of Association of El 
Salvador’s constitution.65  
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 Indonesia’s legislation has allowed independent unions since July 1998. However, Tim 
Connor, a representative of the prominent aid organization Oxfam describes how 
workers` rights to unionize have been violated in the report We are not machines66 
I want to address how workers of the P.T. Nikomas Gemilang factory (a plant in 
Indonesia who produces for Adidas and Nike) who organized a demonstration for better 
wages December 17 and 18, 1999 were subject to intense intimidation and 
harassment.67 Some of the workers who participated in the demonstration actually 
reported to fear for their lives. Julianto, one of the key demonstrators, was taken into an 
office by factory managers who shouted at him and told him he would be attacked by 
hired thugs that if he did not stop organising workers. This incident took place in the 
presence of an Indonesian soldier. Furthermore, Julianto was repeatedly approached by 
strangers who warned him that his life was at risk if he did not resign from the factory. 
Another Nikomas worker found his residence ransacked by a local gang after he had 
been subject to similar threats. By April 2000 each one of the twenty workers who had 
played a key role in organising the demonstration had been forced to resign because of 
this intimidation. Workers claimed that the Nikomas factory had a record of hiring 
thugs to frighten workers who engaged in union activities. The story above is a grave 
example of how workers` rights to speak up against illegitimate labor treatment have 
been violated. 68  Human rights organizations suggested that Nike establish a 
confidential procedure for workers to notify independent organisations if they receive 
any threats or discrimination for union activity. However, these requests were allegedly 
ignored by Nike at the time this report was published, in 2002.69  
 
 
Why Female Workers can be More Vulnerable to Exploitation  
David M. Boje, a scholar who is the author of the article Nike, Greek goddess of victory 
or cruelty? Women’s stories of Asian factory life70 argues that hiring young, unmarried 
women from the countryside makes it easier for Nike contractors to get away with 
abusive labor practices because women are expected to be submissive in Asian cultures. 
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The passage below sheds light upon why women in Asian cultures may be easy targets 
for “extreme exploitation” in factories: 
In sum, religious and rural family tradition that fosters subservience to male authority, 
passive resistance to male domination, and an ethic of hard work in harsh conditions have 
equipped a generation of females to fit perfectly into capitalist wage employment. The 
combined result of tradition and repression is a class of women who are docile, non-
rebels, low-wage earners, hard working, and raised culturally to tolerate male 
domination, unsafe conditions, verbal and sexual abuse.” 71  
 
As my research in this chapter has relied on a report about the conditions of factories in 
El Salvador, I want to add that the norm in Latin America is that men should provide 
for the family and that women should stay at home and take care of children. It is a 
legitimate point that macho culture, be it in China, Indonesia  or El Salvador, makes 
female workers more vulnerable to exploitation by male factory managers. Finally, 
Boje goes so far as to label Nike as a “Greek goddess of cruelty”72. The upcoming 
chapters of my case study will determine whether civil society successfully has lobbied 
for such substantial progress that the labor treatment in Nike contract factories no 
longer represents cruelty in 2008.  
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Chapter 3: Civil Society Reacts: Boycotts and Sweatshops 
 
                        Just Don’t Do It   Just Don’t   Nike, Do It Just 73 
Above are some examples of how Nike’s “just do it” slogan has been mocked by the 
anti-Nike movement. This chapter is dedicated to the growth of the anti Nike 
movement from the child labor scandal in Pakistan, 1996, until Nike lost a lawsuit 
against the labor activist Marc Kasky in the State of California, 2003. I discuss how the 
anti Nike movement grew into a large, international and organized response to Nike’s 
record in factories, including activists, intellectuals and prominent NGOs, such as 
Oxfam International. My research of the anti Nike movement is followed by an analysis 
of how Nike has been subject to customer boycotts in the U.S. and in Europe. Finally, I 
discuss Nike’s loss of the Kasky lawsuit. An important fact is that Nike declined 
responsibility for the conditions of its factory base in the early 1990s on the grounds 
that Nike did not own the factories. However, Nike was finally forced to accept 
responsibility for conditions in factories in 1996 after the child labor scandal in 
Pakistan. The analysis of this chapter provides an important background for my study 
of how Nike’s CSR measures and approach to corporate responsibility have developed 
as a response to boycotts, protests and intense public scrutiny.   
 
The Anti Nike Movement 
Anti-corporate activism and criticism of the labor practices of the biggest corporations 
were timely when the child labor scandal occurred in 1996. Charles Kernaghan, 
representing the National Labor Committee told Congress on April 29, 1996, that the 
clothing line of the popular talk show host Kathie Lee Gifford was made by 13- and 14-
year-olds who worked 20-hour days in factories in Honduras.74 The Kathie Lee Gifford 
incident contributed to put the issue of sweatshops on the agenda in the mid/late 90`s. 
Two years after the Lee Gifford scandal, in 1998, Phil Knight admitted that Nike and its 
logo, called the “swoosh” had “become synonymous with slave wages, forced 
overtime, and arbitrary abuse”75 But why did Nike exactly become the most prominent 
target of anti sweatshop criticism and activism in the late 1990s? In the article Activism, 
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risk and communicational politics the scholar Graham Knight argues that there are four 
main reasons why Nike became the ultimate anti globalization target:76 First, some of 
the initial complains, especially about abusive management behavior, came from 
workers in Nike contracted factories according to Knight. Second, activists realized that 
they needed to choose a company that could afford the additional expenses of 
eliminating sweatshop conditions without putting its financial viability at stake. 
Moreover, as Nike is the biggest company in the sportswear industry (in terms of 
annual revenues), activists believed that targeting Nike as a market leader would be the 
most effective approach to put pressure on the sportswear industry to combat the 
sweatshop issue. Finally, Nike`s business model was instrumental to the company’s 
market success. This model emphasised corporate identity as well as PR strategy that 
integrated aspects of management and communication. An aspect of Nike`s identity and 
PR strategy was to champion disadvantaged people, especially women and racial 
minorities, through sport. Hence, Nike`s business model might have made the company 
more timid and sensitive to activist attacks  
         I analyze how Nike`s public image was hurt when critics presented a picture of 
Nike as a hypocrite and an abusive company profiting on semi-slavery. Nike`s 
legitimacy was under siege on two groundings: First, the company was confronted with 
a performance gap for failing to comply with basic labor standards and to respect 
workers` rights. Second, Nike was confronted with a credibility gap for failing to live 
up to its self proclaimed integrity.77 Yet Nike`s integrity was attacked before the 
company established CSR as a function, one may draw some conclusions that most 
certainly apply to the success or failure of CSR. Corporate integrity is fragile because 
the more ethical a company claims to be, the bigger the blow to the company’s image if 
it is caught doing something inappropriate. In that case, the company’s self proclaimed 
image of integrity will give activists ammunition that can and will be used against it. 
CSR is a timid idea in this respect because if a company emphasises CSR, changes are 
that activists may debunk the company’s image of corporate responsibility if the 
company is caught in a scandal. The lesson is that corporations` willingness to walk the 
talk and practice as they preach will make or break the success and credibility of CSR 
as an idea and a business function. The upcoming chapters will examine to what extent 
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the voices in Nike who are for corporate responsibility have been able to push for 
consistency between what Nike says and the reality in factories  
      The link between Nike`s size and its possible vulnerability to activist pressure  
makes it vital to discuss the link between Nike`s logo and the anti Nike movement. In 
2008 Nike`s logo is one of the world’s most famous corporate trademarks. The research 
paper Nike and Global Labour Practices78 offers some reflections about the power of 
Nike`s logo, and the relation between the Nike “swoosh” and the anti Nike movement 
(Murphy/Mathew: 1-32). Murphy and Mathew quote the analysis of the sociologists 
Robert Goldman and Stephen Papson about the influence of Nike`s logo:  
We live in a cultural economy of signs and Nike`s swoosh is currently the most 
recognizable brand icon in that economy. The Nike swoosh is a commercial symbol that 
has come to stand for athletic excellence, hip authenticity, and playful self awareness. 
While the logo carries the weight of currency, Nike`s “Just do it” slogan has become part 
of the language of everyday life.79  
 
The anti Nike movement includes student activists who have campaigned against Nike 
on campus. Students at the University of Boulder, Colorado organized a fundraising 
that spelled out the difference between a legal minimum wage and a living wage. 
Participants paid an entrance fee of $1.60 (one day’s wage for a worker in Vietnam). 
The winner received $2.10 (the price of three square meals in Vietnam). Nike`s founder 
Phil Knight was invited to be a guest speaker at the Stanford University Business 
School in May 1997. Knight was expecting praise for his understanding of branding 
and his early use of outsourcing. However, the crowd of business students, who 
presumably favored free enterprise, chanted “Hey Phil, off the stage. Pay your workers 
a living wage”, which shows that America truly was outraged by Nike`s behavior in 
factories80. The anti Nike movement is at its strongest and most aggressive in Nike`s 
home state of Oregon. Since the child labor incident was revealed in Pakistan, 
demonstrations outside the Portland Nike town have been among America’s largest and 
most militant ones. Examples are an enormous, threatening Phil Knight doll with dollar 
signs for eyes and a twelve-foot Nike logo dragged by young children (for the sake of 
dramatizing child labor). Yet the anti-Nike movement is governed by non violence, a 
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protest in Eugene, Oregon, led to actions of vandalism, such as the tearing down of a 
fence protecting the construction of a new Nike Town.81  
        The article “Ideologically motivated activism – how activist groups influence 
corporate change activities”82 by Frank den Hond and Frank G.A. De Bakker analyzes 
how activism may influences activities that contribute to social change within 
corporations. Den Hond and De Bakker argue that when the responsibility for 
addressing a wide range of social issues is transferred from the state to corporations, 
activist groups more than previously challenge firms to take up social issues. Hence, 
activist groups, such as groups that belong to the anti Nike movement, actually seek to 
influence the nature and level of corporate social change activities. What they aim for 
on a long term basis is to bring about substantial change, such as in the area of labor 
standards. To what extent the anti-Nike movement has been successful in this regard is 
off the subject of this paragraph. However, the article uses Burma as an example of 
successful activism: “For instance dozens of companies ceased their activities in Burma 
when pressured by activist groups whose motivation was to stimulate democracy and 
peace in this country ruled by, arguably, an oppressive and brutal junta” 83 The authors 
draw parallels to how activists have continued to pressure the sportswear industry: 
“Likewise, activist groups in the anti-sweatshop movement keep exerting pressure on 
major brand producers in the apparel and shoe industries to improve working 
conditions and wages in the industries’ international supply chains.” 84  
         Activist groups that belong to the anti Nike movement are not the only ones that 
continue to exert a pressure on Nike. NGOs that Nike collaborates with, such as 
Business for Social Responsibility continue to lobby for improvements for workers in 
Nike factories.85 There is a twofold collective effort going on trying to push for 
betterment in those factories. The anti Nike movement has been focusing on, and 
continues to focus on what they are against, rather than what they are for. My point 
exactly is that the actions by individuals and NGOs that represent the anti Nike 
movement have revolved around what they consider to be illegitimate labor practices in 
factories. The NGOs that collaborate with Nike have a more pragmatic position, as they 
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work with Nike as a CSR partner, to lobby for the positive changes that they want to 
see in factories. In the introduction I described the most important NGOs that Nike has 
collaboration with. Furthermore, Nike engaged in a pilot project, ending in September 
2000, launched by the NGO Global Alliance for Workers and Communities.86 The 
following factories in Thailand that mainly produce Nike products were subject to an 
assessment study conducted by the NGOs Global Alliance for communities and 
workers and Thai Labour: Lian Thai, Pan Asia Footwear, Saha Union, Rana Shoe, and 
Liberty Garment. There is no question that Nike engages in collaboration with NGOs. 
The question is whether Nike sees such a significant case for CSR in the area of labor 
standards that BSR may contribute to much needed improvements in factories.87  
 
Customer Boycotts 
 
There is some evidence that Nike has been subject to consumer boycotts globally due  
            to Nike`s past record in factories. The website of the grassroots based organization 
Vietnam Labor Watch promotes a boycott against Nike88: Another website promotes a 
boycott against Nike in Canada, and the headline of the website is “the Nike boycott 
spreads across Alberta”89  These websites indicate that Nike has been the target of 
organized boycotts. I have not been able to collect data about the size of Nike boycotts. 
However, Nike was substantially hurt financially in the last quarter of 1998. In his book 
The Market for Virtue the Berkeley professor David Vogel Nike experienced its first 
financial loss in thirteen years when Nike`s earnings fell by 69%. Nike laid off 1,600 
employees.  It was estimated that a part of this sales decline was caused by boycotts 
because of sweatshop allegations.90 Financial woes made Phil Knight more humble 
toward Nike`s critics. A Harvard Business School case study concluded that “Nike`s 
fiscal woes did what hundreds of hard articles had failed to do: they took some of the 
bravado out of Phil Knight.”91  In Knight’s speech to the National Press Club in May 
1998 he admitted that: “The Nike product has become synonymous with slave wages, 
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forced overtime, and arbitrary abuse. I truly believe that the American consumer does 
not want to buy products made in abusive conditions.”92  
         More generally, the authors of Can Labor Standards Improve Under 
Globalization?93 Kimberly Ann Elliott and Richard B Freeman argue that there is 
evidence that customers want decent working conditions associated with the product 
they purchase. Elliott and Freeman discuss findings which indicate that some customers 
may be inclined to boycott companies with bad labor practices. Customers` willingness 
to pay more for decent working conditions was found in 4 forms:   
-how shareholders and share prices respond to allegations that goods are produced 
under poor conditions 
-experiments that give participants the choice between acting in their own narrow, 
selfish interest or taking the interests of others into consideration  
-the responses of corporations to anti sweatshop campaigns; as well as  
-surveys of customer preferences94  
        Elliott and Freeman discuss samples from two surveys conducted by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research. According to the first sample 46% of the consumers 
said they cared “a lot” about the conditions of the workers who make the clothes they 
purchase. 38% said they cared “somewhat”. Only 8% said they cared “a little”, and the 
same number, 8% answered “not at all or no response”. 81% were willing to pay more 
for an item if assured it was made under good working conditions. The average 
additional amount consumers were willing to pay for a $10 item was $2.80. And the 
average additional amount consumers were willing to pay for a $100 item was $15. The 
second sample showed that 84% of the consumers asked said they would choose an 
option to a T-shirt that students said was made under poor conditions. 65% said that 
they would not buy a T-shirt that was made under poor conditions at all. Those who 
said they would buy a T-shirt under poor conditions would do so at an average discount 
of $4.30. However, 78 % said they would pay more if assured that the T shirt was made 
under good conditions. Those who said they would pay more would pay an average 
additional amount of $1, 8395. These are the data presented from the samples that Elliott 
and Freeman discuss in Can labor standards improve under globalization? 
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How are these numbers are applicable for my case study of Nike? Above all, the 
numbers indicate that a vast majority (in both samples a staggering 84%) does care to 
some degree about how people who produce their garments are treated. Two other 
surveys: one by the Marymount University’s Center for Ethical Concerns (conducted in 
1995, 1996 and 1999) and one by the University of Maryland’s program on 
International Policy Attitudes both show that three of four customers asked said they 
would actually avoid stores if they knew that the products were produced under poor 
conditions. This confirms strongly the findings of the two samples that an 
overwhelming majority would respond negatively to facts about poor working 
conditions96 I am assuming that this evidence that may be applicable when consumers 
buy sportswear.  
         However, it is interesting that the results from the second survey reveal what the 
authors describe as “a fundamental asymmetry in responses to information about good 
and bad working conditions”97 Yet consumers said they would pay an average of $1, 83 
for the assurance that an item was made under decent conditions, this is less than half of 
the discount consumers asked for to buy an item made under poor conditions. The fact 
that the price response to information about poor conditions much exceeded the price 
response to information about good conditions complies with prospect theory. Prospect 
theory shows that potential losses are weighed more heavily than potential gains. This 
implies that companies may lose revenues if product lines are associated with abuse. 
On the other hand, corporations have modest space to increase prices for a product line 
made under excellent conditions.  
         Nevertheless, people may not behave consistently with what they say. Hence, 
survey evidence may not convince hard core skeptics. People who only care about 
themselves are usually not happy to admit their own selfishness. The Dictator’s Game 
may fit this case to some extent. The only rule of this game is that whatever the boss 
decides goes. In experiments two selected players received an envelope each. One 
envelope contains $100 and the other envelope is empty. Only an average of 20% of the 
players who got the $100 kept the $ 100.The typical behavior was to keep 40-60 % of 
the money. Hence, most people shared with others98 under circumstances that allowed 
them to be completely selfish. Freeman and Elliott reason that: 
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Both in experiments and in the social world, people behave as if they care for more 
than their own immediate pleasure. Thus, our presumption is that if people say they 
care about labor standards and that they are willing to pay a bit more for products 
made under good conditions and would shun products made under poor conditions, 
they are more likely to be telling the truth than deceiving the “surveyor” 99  
 
Ultimately, Nike`s case for CSR would be stronger, and Nike`s past case for using 
sweatshop labor would weaken, if there was direct evidence that customers reject 
sweatshop running shoes in favor of more costly running shoes made under decent 
conditions. Unfortunately, no such direct evidence exists.  
      The pro globalization economist Martin Wolf argues in his book “Why 
Globalization Works” that corporations cannot cope with bad publicity: 100  
Threatened by the blackmail of protesters, they will do almost anything to satisfy 
their critics. Occasionally, companies will be right to do so, for what they have done, 
or condoned, is a scandal. Sometimes, however, they will be wrong to do so, for 
what they are supposed to do, may hurt those they are supposed to help.101  
 
Wolf reasons that it is not so that consumers are controlled by corporations. Quite the 
contrary, he argues that consumers control corporations. Wolf uses a story of how the 
British government and Shell abandoned a presumably legitimate plan to dump the 
Brent Spar oil platform at sea in favor of more expensive and more environmentally 
damaging onshore disposal.102 This happened as a result of pressure from a group of 
Greenpeace activists in Germany as well as some hooligans. Wolf’s conclusion is that 
corporations are timid and vulnerable when it comes to consumer pressure. He quotes 
what the prominent globalization critic Naomi Klein remarked in No Logo about how 
brands are actually a source of corporate weakness: “brands, the source of so much 
wealth, is also, it turns out, the corporate Achilles` heel.” 103 The remainder of my 
thesis about how civil society has influenced Nike`s approach to corporate 
responsibility and its CSR measures will examine if Wolf is right.  
 
The Kasky Lawsuit 
Below are the facts according to my interview with Marc Kasky. In 1997, Nike was 
aware of criticism and sweatshop allegations by anti-globalisation activists. Nike 
claimed that subcontractors enforced the Code’s standards regarding compensation, 
safety, no punishment and forced overtime. A management firm was hired to go to 
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Southeast Asia. The report came back, but Nike did not release it. The fact that the 
report was kept confidential because Nike considered it as potentially damaging to its 
reputation shows that Nike was not a very transparent company in 1997. Nonetheless, a 
Nike employee saw the report, and released it to the New York Times. Nike responded 
by a publicity campaign claiming the factories were not sweatshops and Nike was a 
“model corporate citizen”. California has a statute that allows constituencies to sue 
corporations on the grounds of fraud or false advertisement.104 Kasky sued Nike on the 
grounds that California’s statute about fraud and false marketing should apply for all 
factual information designed to sell products, including press releases and  interviews 
on television. The legal question was if the First Amendment right to free speech 
allowed such an interpretation of the California statute. The California Supreme Court 
ruled 6-3 in favor of Kasky in 2002, and the U.S. Supreme Court accepted this outcome 
in 2003.  
         Marc Kasky sued Nike because he wanted California’s constituencies to be 
entitled to know the truth about Nike`s labor practices.105 His driving force was that 
people should have the right to truthful and correct information about corporations’ 
products and how they do business. In this perspective Kasky most certainly won a 
victory. Corporations that do business in California need to be more careful with facts. 
Misrepresentation is discouraged as corporate communications is made more leverage. 
Truthfulness may be checked.  Nike`s loss of the Kasky lawsuit strengthened those 
inside Nike who were inclined to argue for ethical behavior because corporate 
management learned the lesson that lies may be used against Nike in a lawsuit. The  
Kasky lawsuit has been subject to much debate. In the article Let Nike Stay in The 
Game he columnist Bob Herbert argues that the First Amendment which gives Nike`s 
critics the right to label it as an exploitative, abusive and obnoxious company should 
give Nike the right to defend its labor practices.106  
         My stand is that I strongly favor the Freedom of Speech and agree with the 
outcome of the Kasky lawsuit. It is so that constituencies have an expanded right to sue 
corporation after the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the verdict of the Kasky lawsuit. 
However, Nike still has a legitimate right to defend its corporate behavior and labor 
practices in press releases and public appearances in the State of California. I believe it 
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is a good thing that California’s citizens have the right to check the truthfulness of 
companies` statements in press releases and public appearances. Companies should 
defend their behavior with the truth, not with lies. The next chapter about how Nike`s 
CSR strategy has developed examines to what extent Nike changed its behavior for the 
better after they were battled by Marc Kasky in Court.  
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Chapter 4: How Nike`s CSR Strategy has Developed 1996 – Present 
The Swedish author of the influential pro-globalization book Till världkapitalismens 
försvar Johan Norberg argues that big companies have to act respectably to survive 
because negative attention may cause loss.107 Norberg claims that yet it takes decades 
to build favorable brand recognition, activists may tear down the brand in a few weeks. 
He argues that this makes it possible to push corporations to change behavior quickly if 
they do something inappropriate108 How successful has civil society really been in 
improving Nike`s behavior and conditions in factories through CSR since the function 
was established in 1996? I challenge Norberg`s reasoning about how quickly activists 
can influence companies to change behavior. My suggestion is that Nike’s change of 
behavior has evolved over a decade since 1996. Therefore, Nike`s history is not one of 
overnight transformation of corporate behavior through CSR. Still, I suggest that Nike`s 
history shows that civil society to a large extent has been able to pressure Nike to 
improve its corporate behavior.  
         In chapter 3 about civil society`s reactions to sweatshop scandals I wanted to 
show how actors outside Nike have pushed for change in factories in this chapter. I take 
my treatment of the multilevel theory one step further. The actual impact of Nike`s 
CSR measures in improving factory conditions is the benchmark of civil society`s 
ability to push for substantial change through CSR. Therefore, I put the multilevel 
theory’s assumption that the public is capable of pushing for actual change through 
CSR to the test. Have conditions in factories changed so substantially that there is much 
hope for the future of CSR? That is what I want to find out exactly throughout this 
chapter. Furthermore, the institutional theory gives an important contribution to this 
chapter. I will see John Campbell’s proposition about public regulation in relation with 
Nike`s loss in Court against Marc Kasky. For a brief recap, Nike lost a lawsuit against 
the activist Marc Kasky in the Supreme Court of the state of California. The U.S. 
Supreme Court in Washington D.C. has not overturned this verdict.109 I want to know if 
the Kasky lawsuit contributed to change the company`s behavior in any way.  
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Nike`s Business Case for CSR and the Development of CSR 
Nike`s last Corporate Responsibility report Innovate for a better world sees the 
development of Nike’s CSR strategy divided into three phases since 1996.110 The first 
phase (1996-2001) was a phase of establishing CSR as a function. The second phase 
(2001-2004) was, according to Nike, a phase of social interaction with organizations 
that belong to the CSR community. Finally, Nike sees the third and current phase 
(2005-2010) as one of integrating CSR into the company`s business model.111  I accept 
Nike`s time table for the sake of my analysis because I want to measure Nike`s CSR 
efforts against the company’s description of its timetable. It will be of interest for my 
case study to research if Nike has lived, and lives up, to the descriptions of its corporate 
responsibility activities and measures. 
                     My research about civil society’s reactions to illegitimate conditions in Nike 
factories showed that Nike did not see a case for business ethics, or care about factory 
conditions, until an estimated correlation was found between sweatshop allegations and 
lost revenues. This tells us that Nike had a negative and cynical motivation for 
establishing CSR as a company function solely for the purpose of risk management. 
Nike did not want to risk future sales declines due to scandals followed by boycotts. 
CSR was a new concept in the business community when Nike established the function. 
The story of how Nike accepted CSR as a PR vehicle in the late 1990`s could imply 
that CSR was born as a function because some companies endorsed the idea of 
corporate responsibility because they wanted to protect their brand images. This does 
not imply that those companies wanted to avoid scandals because of their conscience. 
However, what they wanted was to safeguard the value of their brands against lost 
revenues.  
         The second phase of Nike`s CSR history implies that Nike showed increased 
willingness to cooperate with civil society organizations and representatives because 
Nike saw a business incentive to improve its corporate image. I would like to discuss 
whether Nike`s interaction with civil society and the CSR community created any 
improvement in factories at all. At present, in the final phase of Nike`s CSR history, 
Nike claims to believe it will be a competitive advantage to integrate corporate 
responsibility into its core business model, whereas the triple bottom line of CSR serves 
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to deliver financial, social and environmental sustainability. The conditions in Nike`s 
factory base today shed light upon the substance of Nike`s current case for CSR.  
 
Phase 1: 1996-2000: Nike Implements CSR as a Company Function 
When Nike’s General Manager in Jakarta was asked why claims about abusive labor 
treatment in Indonesian factories had not been under investigation in the early 1990s he 
replied “I don’t know what I need to know… They are our subcontractors. It’s not 
within our scope to investigate” 112 Although Nike`s Code of Conduct was drafted in 
1992, critics were dissatisfied because there was little or no evidence that conditions 
had improved at the time of the child labor scandal in Pakistan.113 Nike`s first corporate 
responsibility report in 2001 was a landmark in Nike`s history in that it symbolized a 
tremendous shift in how Nike countered its critics. Instead of continuing to disclaim 
responsibility for conditions in factories Nike did not own, Nike established corporate 
responsibility as a function in order to silence its critics. One of Nike`s responses to the 
child labor scandal was to be the first corporation to join the Apparel Industry 
Partnership, which was an initiative by a Clinton administration task force designed to 
foster collaboration and dialogue between the apparel and footwear industries and their 
critics. From 1996-2001 Knight announced a number of reforms, which included an 
increase of the minimum age of sneaker workers to 18 and apparel workers. Micro 
loans were made available. All suppliers were required to adopt American standards for 
clean air. Educational programs for workers` families were expanded. Finally Nike 
made the decision to allow labor and human rights groups allowed workers to 
participate in monitoring of Nike`s factory base.114  
       Moreover, the SHAPE audit was launched in 1997 as a monitoring measure. The 
goal of SHAPE audits is to provide a general image of the factory’s compliance with 
labor, environment, safety and health standards A SHAPE inspection was normally 
performed by Nike’s field-based production staff. SHAPE inspections would take about 
a day and occur between once or twice each year.115 It may be argued that the SHAPE 
audits were a modest step in the right direction toward more responsible corporate 
behavior.If nothing else, the audits represented an increased willingness to monitor, and 
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accept responsibility for working conditions in factories. Nevertheless, despite the 
measures described above that Nike implemented in response to its critics, the company 
did not promise to increase wages in this phase.116 This is a very important fact because 
it shows that Nike was unwilling to make the most costly and most needed effort to 
improve exploitative conditions in factories at this time. It is evidence that the voices in 
Nike who saw CSR as a necessary evil to combat critics probably were the most 
dominant ones at this early stage of Nike’s CSR history.  
         In 1997 the prominent civil rights advocate in the 1960`s, and former Atlanta, 
Georgia major, Andrew Young was hired by Nike to conduct an, according to Young, 
independent evaluation of Nike`s Code of Conduct and its application in 12 factories in 
Asia; Vietnam, Indonesia and China. It is debatable whether his evaluation was 
independent. One may ask how it could have been independent when he was hired to 
do it for profit. Nevertheless, Young`s research included specific suggestions about 
how Nike could improve the application of the Code and possibly enhance it. Among 
Young’s findings were that the 12 factories were well lit, clean, organized and 
adequately ventilated. Further, according to Young there were “no evidence or pattern 
of systematic abuse or mistreatment”117 in the factories that he visited. His message was 
that working conditions in factories had been subject to improvement, but that Nike 
needed to do more. The conclusion of his report was: “It is my sincere belief that Nike 
is doing a good job in the application of its Code of Conduct, but Nike can and should 
do more”118   
         The report backfired on Nike. In the article Mr.Young gets it wrong 119 the 
columnist Bob Herbert criticises Young for deliberately ignoring the most blatant 
abuses faced by the Asian workers, who the report was designed to help. Young’s 
report claims that no incidents of child labor were detected in the factories he visited. 
Herbert points out Young’s failure to recognize that child labor has not been the main 
issue for Nike`s critics. The critics focused on allegations that Nike`s Asian factories 
used techniques ranging from enforced overtime to harsh discipline and sometimes 
physical abuse and that adult workers were paid starvation wages. Furthermore, Herbert 
criticises the report for being “disingenuous” on the issue of wages: It says that “It is 
not reasonable to argue that any one particular U.S. company should be forced to pay 
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U.S. wages abroad while its direct competitors do not”120 Herbert’s response was 
“Nike's critics, including this one, argue that the company's full-time overseas workers 
should be paid at least a subsistence wage for the areas in which they live. A dollar fifty 
a day is not subsistence wage in Ho Chi Minh City” 121  
         Another critic was the reporter Stephen Glass in the article the young and the 
feckless122 Glass criticized Young for lack of substantive recommendations, his only 
ones being that Nike consider independent labor monitoring, that Nike improve 
grievance procedures and that Nike distribute the Code of Conduct translated in the 
local language, so it could be accessible to workers who did not understand English. 
This criticism is legitimate. However, it should be noted that there are allegations on 
the internet that Glass` article contained factual lies. I cannot verify these allegations. 
But the implication seems to be that not all of Nike`s critics can be trusted to act with 
integrity. Finally, the report may justifiably be labelled as a slick and shallow PR move 
because it paid a civil rights leader, whose integrity America did not question, to 
whitewash Nike from criticism.  
         What was the impact of Nike`s initial CSR efforts? At least it represented a 
progress in itself that Nike accepted responsibility for the conditions of its factory base, 
and established CSR as a company function. Critics of CSR might argue that CSR`s 
true value comes only when it is enacted at any cost. The implication of this is that 
since Nike refused to promise to increase wages, the company clearly was not willing 
to enact CSR at any cost. It is not certain that there are any multinational corporations 
that want to commit to enact CSR at any cost. This is to say that left wing critics of 
CSR might even argue that since Nike, or corporate America as a whole, will not enact 
CSR at any cost CSR does not have true value in itself. Nonetheless, I believe that CSR 
has inherent value in itself because it is such an important idea for the future of 
humanity. If all companies demonstrated corporate responsibility that would certainly 
create a more sustainable globalization. My approach is that the true value of CSR as an 
idea and a function should be measured in its impact on society. The first phase of 
Nike`s corporate responsibility history laid the foundation for all upcoming CSR 
activities and measures. The impact of this foundation will be revealed through my 
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analysis of how Nike`s CSR strategy has played out in reality after the function was 
established to date.  
 
Phase 2: 2001 – 2006: Nike Focuses its CSR Strategy on Social Interaction 
Nike claims that the company`s key efforts during this second phase marked by 
“interaction” revolved around making the company`s CSR work more systematic. Key 
efforts in this respect according to Nike were to work for excellence in its management 
auditing as well as in its global process for rating the status of safety, health and 
environment in factories. Furthermore, Nike focused on creating transparency and 
ratings as means to create social interaction. I should add that there was some fire 
fighting in Court during the trials of the Kasky lawsuit, which I discuss in my treatment 
of this second stage of Nike`s CSR history. Moreover, I analyze if Nike`s self 
proclaimed focus on interaction contributed to a foundation of improved conditions in 
factories through CSR.  
         According to Nike’s Corporate Responsibility Report fiscal year 2004 Nike`s 
CSR measures were focused on three strategic priorities throughout this phase of 
Nike`s CSR history. Those priorities were ranging from charity, labor standards to 
environmental sustainability: 
To effect positive, systemic change in working conditions within the footwear, apparel and 
equipment industries; 
To create innovative and sustainable products; and 
To use sport as a tool for positive social change and campaign to turn sport and physical activity 
into a fundamental right for every young person.123 
 
The way Nike spelled out the company’s priorities shows that Nike started a process of 
integrating CSR into its core business, in that the priorities link CSR to innovation and 
hence growth. There may not be a proven general link between corporate ethics and 
profits. Nonetheless, the fact that Nike started linking CSR with innovation in this 
phase shows that Nike came to believe that CSR would be profitable for the 
headquarters` bottom line. This implies that voices inside Nike who were inclined to 
argue in favor of corporate responsibility began a process of influencing the most 
cynical voices 
         In this paragraph I explain how Nike reformed its monitoring process in Fiscal 
Year 2003. Nike started a shift from independent monitoring of labor practices to a 
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new, internal monitoring process called the M-(for “management”) Audit.” This 
Management (M)-Audit is designed to uncover problems. Nike`s corporate 
responsibility report of 2004 says that problems identified through M-Audits have 
helpful in integrating CSR in factories with Nike`s business strategy. Such 
Management (M)-audits include factory inspections, documentation checks as well as 
confidential on-site interviews with individual workers, supervisors and managers.124 
The 2004 report explains that approximately 90 % of the audits are announced, 
meaning that approximately 10 percent of the Management (M)-Audits are 
unannounced. Nike claims that announced audits tend to be the more effective ones. 
Although factories cannot prepare for audits without prior notice, Nike claims that 
much of the information needed assumes access to important records and persons 
within factory management.  
         M-audits are a systematic measure in that one M-audit covers over 80 issues. The 
04 report says that there are 46 employees belonging to Nike`s compliance team who 
regularly conduct M-Audits. Further, the typical M-Auditor is a female (approximately 
74 percent of the compliance staff who regularly conduct M-audits) under the age of 
30, both reflecting the working population. Nike claims that they try to hire native 
auditors, because they have the advantages of being native in the local language and 
understanding the local culture. In 2003 and 2004, over 9,200 factory workers were 
interviewed in person as part of the M-Audit process. Each interview took roughly 30 
minutes.125 In this phase Nike complied to use independent monitoring conducted by 
the Fair Labor Association (FLA), which is a collaborative association including brands 
(such as Nike), universities and NGOs. The mission of FLA as a collaborative initiative 
“is to combine the efforts of industry, civil society organizations, and colleges and 
universities to protect workers’ rights and improve working conditions worldwide by 
promoting adherence to international labor standards.” 126 Nike entered a three-year 
accreditation process with the Fair Labor Association (FLA) in 2003, which licensed 
independent Fair Labor Association (FLA) monitors to conduct unannounced audits of 
five percent of Nike supply chain each year. In 2003, this constituted 40 independent 
audits of Nike factories. The FLA would review audit findings, oversee remediation 
efforts and internal compliance processes, and report publicly on each of these 
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activities. This process of accreditation by the FLA represented an independent review 
of Nike`s internal systems and processes for managing compliance for all of Nike`s 
product categories – apparel, footwear and equipment.  
         In fiscal year 2004, Nike`s factories were subject to three monitoring measures: 
the SHAPE-audits, the M-audits as well as independent monitoring by the FLA in some 
factories on an annual basis. This brings up the questions of whether Nike`s monitoring 
of working conditions actually contributed to improvements of conditions in factories at 
this phase of Nike`s CSR history. Research shows that there are underlying problems in 
factories in developing countries that monitoring as a CSR measure does not solve. Jill 
Esbenshade`s research in her book Monitoring Sweatshops: Workers, Consumers, and 
the Global Apparel Industry 127 concludes that Codes of Conduct and monitoring “to 
date have not significantly improved the situation for garment workers around the 
world”128 A key point Esbenshade makes about private monitoring is that one of the 
most critical weaknesses of it is that it has normally not contributed to protect workers` 
right to unionize. History shows that unions have played an important role in improving 
conditions in factories. Another important point about monitoring is that although it 
may improve conditions, monitoring may not guarantee compliance. Nike’s CR Report 
04 writes that “The limitation of most monitoring tools is that they identify problems, 
but are often inadequate in identifying root causes.” 129 Finally, according to 
Esbenshade companies have become more reluctant to make bold claims about the 
excellence of the company’s Code of Conduct and monitoring because of the 
shortcomings of monitoring as a means to correct problems.   
         But did something good still come out of the monitoring that took place in Nike`s 
factory base at this time? At least Nike demonstrated willingness to monitor the 
conditions of its factory base. Despite the shortcomings and limitations of monitoring to 
improve working conditions, it is necessary a control device to ensure that the Code of 
Conduct be enforced in factories. Monitoring is also a necessary function in order to 
detect problems that the working population in Nike`s supply chain faces and to track 
progress in correcting those problems. Although Esbenshade`s reasoning above sheds 
critical light upon the potential of private monitoring to contribute to solve and correct 
problems in factories, I want to conclude that the M-audits might have been of a certain 
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value. These audits were a thorough monitoring measure that provided Nike with an 
overview of problems of non-compliance with the Code in its chain of factories. 
Excessive overtime was identified as a pressing and extensive problem through the M-
audits in this phase of Nike`s CSR history. In my treatment of Nike`s last phase of 
corporate responsibility I go into detail about how the overtime issue plays out in 
reality today. At this point I just want to suggest that it was a positive sign in terms of 
leverage and transparency when Nike admitted that excessive overtime was a serious 
problem in factories 
         Before I leave the second phase of Nike`s CSR history I discuss what Nike`s loss 
in the Kasky lawsuit implied for the later development of CSR as a company function 
since Nike was faced with a final defeat in Court, June, 26, 2003. The majority of the 
Court upheld the verdict of the California Supreme Court on the grounds that they 
decided not to address the Constitutional questions related to Kasky`s victory in the 
Court of California. As this verdict has not been overturned to date, Nike does not have 
a First Amendment licence to lie to the constituencies of California. September 12, 
2003, Kasky and Nike announced a settlement of which Nike complied to pay $1.5 
million to the Washington, D.C.-based Fair Labor Association (FLA) for “program 
operations and worker development programs focused on education and economic 
opportunity.”130 This settlement at the price of $1.5 million was an inexpensive means 
of fire fighting for Nike`s headquarters. Yet Kasky and his lawyers wanted to move on, 
critics have labelled the settlement a “pittance”. Some activists felt that Nike got away 
from closer scrutiny for a petty amount of money.   
         The Kasky lawsuit does not proceed the M-audits that I described earlier. The M-
audits had not been introduced as a monitoring device at the time Marc Kasky filed a 
lawsuit against Nike on the basis of a confidential report dated 1997 that had been 
leaked to the New York Times.131 Hence, the majority of the battle in Court took place 
in the time line between the release of Nike`s first Corporate Responsibility report in 
2001 and the implementation of the M-audits. In my presentation of the outcome of the 
Kasky lawsuit in chapter 3 I concluded that something good came out of the loss of the 
Kasky lawsuit because it strenghtened the more ethical voices in Nike who were 
inclined to argue for corporate responsibility. I suggest one positive outcome of the 
Kasky lawsuit was that Nike realized a need to change corporate communications about 
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conditions in factories. Next I review to what extent Nike`s communications about 
corporate responsibility changed after the company was battled in Court by Marc 
Kasky and his lawyers and what the implications of those changes would be for the 
development of CSR since. 
         When the report stating that the Code was poorly enforced in factories were 
leaked to the New York Times, Nike`s respond with a large scale PR campaign was not 
a step ahead CSR wise. Instead of using a PR campaign to “battle” its critics, Nike 
should have admitted to mistakes in factories. One may justifyably label Nike`s PR 
campaign as a slick, hollow and illegitimate response to damaging information about 
labor practices in the company`s supply chain. However, Nike was quiet about 
corporate responsibility during and after the Kasky lawsuit until its second corporate 
responsibility report was published in 2004. This period of silence might indicate that 
Nike realized that it would be wise of the company to refrain from presenting the 
treatment of humans in factories as better than it really was. At this time when Nike 
was silent about CSR in public, Nike still talked to civil society representatives and 
organizations behind the scenes. The implication is that Nike developed a somewhat 
more humble attitude toward its critics.  
         I suggest that the more ethical voices of company insiders realized that Nike had 
to demonstrate a more substantial commitment to corporate responsibility, and that 
CSR just for window dressing would not do in the long run, if Nike were to be 
respected for its corporate responsibility practices in factories. Under the assumption 
that my research accepts Nike`s time table, the shift in Nike`s CSR focus from social 
interaction to business integration implies a shift toward a more profound willingness to 
engage in CSR activities and to improve conditions in factories. After all, the business 
integration of CSR requires more effort than interacting with civil society and the CSR 
community. The substance of Nike`s CSR initiatives designed to create transformation 
in the final and current phase, will be the ultimate test of how much the Kasky lawsuit 
really influenced Nike to work for change in factories. 
 
Phase 3: 2006-2010:  
Nike Focuses on Transformation Through CSR  
Nike’s 2005/06 report describes “transformation” as an emphasis on CSR as a means to 
create systematic change through the integration of CSR into the company`s core 
business model. I want to analyze the current impact and future potential of the 
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measures that Nike claims to be designed to create systematic progress in factories 
through CSR. Nike lists the following issues as the main priorities of its self-
proclaimed focus on transformation: “Focus on building excellence in factory 
remediation, developing a sustainable sourcing strategy, building business integration 
and accountability, increasing contract factory ownership of corporate responsibility” 
and finally “building industry coalitions” 132 These issues are closely interlinked CSR 
wise. Each one of the issues is clearly related to labor treatment in factories including 
“building a sustainable sourcing strategy” as it refers to social and environmental 
sustainability. Labor treatment in factories is the most prioritized area of Nike’s CSR 
strategy, because this is where Nike has received almost all negative publicity about its 
business practices.  
         In its latest Corporate Responsibility report Nike claims that the overall aim of 
CSR as a company function in factories is to “foster systemic change by building 
responsible competitiveness into our entire business model and enabling a win win for 
workers’ rights and for growth and profitability across our supply chain.”133 Nike has 
set four key targets by fiscal year 2011 in order to foster such systematic change. The 
first target is to eliminate excessive overtime in contract factories. The second target is 
to implement tailored Human Resources (HR) systems in 100% of the focus factories of 
Nike’s supply chain. The third target is to implement freedom of association 
educational programs in 100% of focus factories. The fourth and final target is to lead 
multi-brand collaboration on compliance issues in 30% of Nike’s supply chain.134 The 
four goals Nike has set by 2011 are ambitious and important. I believe Nike will 
accomplish each one of them, because a big, competitive company like Nike is inclined 
to set high, yet attainable goals. If Nike achieves the four goals above by 2011, that 
would represent a massive improvement in Nike factories since Nike lost the Kasky 
lawsuit in 2003. The remainder of this chapter discusses how Nike`s progress toward 
the goal to eliminate excessive overtime in contract factories to date and impdiments to 
the freedom of association in detail. 
         I start my analysis of Nike’s goal to eliminate excessive overtime by fiscal year 
2011 by showing how Nike`s leadership Code addresses this issue.  
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(Contractor) certifies that it complies with legally mandated work hours; uses 
overtime only when employees are fully compensated according to local law; 
informs the employee at the time of the hiring if mandatory overtime is a condition 
of employment, and, on a regularly scheduled basis provides one day off in seven, 
and requires no more that 60 hours per week, or complies with local limits if they are 
lower135 
This standard of Nike`s Code forbids factories to require workers to put in up to over 
60 hours a week, even if the factories comply with local overtime laws. However, the 
numbers according to Nike`s 2005/06 report showed that working hours were found to 
exceed legal limits in 55% of Nike`s M-audits, and that hours were found to exceed the 
standards of Nike`s leadership Code in 85% of the M-audits conducted.136 This clearly 
shows that excessive overtime has been a widespread and long standing problem in 
Nike`s factory base. 
         But what Nike has done to improve compliance with its overtime standards to 
date? In June 2005, Nike launched an Excessive Overtime Taskforce chaired by its 
current CEO, Mark Parker.137 According to Nike`s description of how the overtime 
issue plays out in Chinese Factories, 2008, it continues to be one of the most commonly 
cited labor-standards problems in China.. There are still instances across the industry of 
workers often putting in 360 hours per month, with some logging up to 400 hours, with 
no days off.138 Excessive overtime has proven a tough problem to solve in the 
sportswear industry.  In examining the root causes of excessive overtime, Nike has 
found the following issues in its supply chain according to its China update: 
inconsistent law enforcement, flawed factory management approaches and labor 
practices that had unintended consequences at the contract factory.139 At least, Nike 
gained an understanding of the root causes of excessive overtime. In 2007 Nike worked 
with contracted footwear factories in China to develop a database for factories and Nike 
to track overtime hours and causes. This database has been rolled out to all contract 
footwear factories in Asia, and will be implemented in 2008 with key apparel factories. 
The data will be used to analyze and address causes of excessive overtime.140 The 
above facts about how Nike addresses the issue of excessive overtime shows that Nike 
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does take important action steps in order to reach its goal to eliminate excessive 
overtime. If Nike achieves its goal to implement tailored Human Resource systems in 
focus factories in 2011 that could prove effective in reducing excessive hours focus in 
factories with improved tracking of working hours. If Nike succeeds in eliminating 
excessive overtime in contract factories in three years from now would represent a 
milestone for CSR as a function in factories.  
         I turn to discuss how the issue of freedom of association plays out in reality. The 
most apparent obstacle is the fact that China, which is Nike`s most important market of 
production,141 has restricted the freedom of association by law. The only union allowed 
in China is the communist All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU).142 Play 
Fair 2008, a Chinese initiative to improve workers` rights in the sports industry from 
the past Beijing Games until the next Games in London, 2008, argues that sourcing 
from jurisdictions where freedom of association is restricted by law, such as China and 
Vietnam, has increased. Furthermore, dismissal of union leaders and upporters is 
reported to still be a problem in factories in countries that do not restrict freedom of 
association by law. In September, 2006, 1 week after the recruitment for a legally 
registered union at the Thai Garment Export factory that produces apparel for Nike, six 
union leaders were dismissed. However, the six of them were reinstated after 
investegation by the NGO Workers` Rights Consortium, which is an example that civil 
society investigation and scrutiny sometimes can do justice to humans who have been 
unfairly dismissed because they wanted to speak up for their rights.143 Another problem 
in factories, according to Play Fair 2008, has been refusal to recognize and negotiate 
with unions by management. Finally, Play Fair 2008 argues that it is insufficient when 
worker commitees have been promoted as a substitute for unions in some factories, as 
worker commitees have a weaker voice than unions in issues that concern workers` 
well being.144 
         The above paragraph shows that there are severe impediments in the way of 
freedom of association. It implies that Nike may not be as proactive as is should be in 
defending workers` rights to unionize. It may not help much to educate workers in 
Chinese focus factories about the freedom of association when China restricts freedom 
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of association. What we can hope is that educating workers in focus factories about 
freedom of association will make the workers it may concern more aware of and 
assertive about the rights that they do have in countries that allow union activities, such 
as Thailand and Indonesia. We can also hope that civil society investigation, such as 
that of the Star factory in Thailand, will be instrumental in reinstating dismissed union 
leaders and supporters.  
         Before I conclude my treatment of how Nike`s CSR efforts play out in reality to 
date I discuss the recent Hytex Incident in Malaysia, July, 2008. A reporter from the 
Australian Channel 7 claimed to be a buyer from the fashion industry. When he entered 
the factory area he interviewed laborers who worked in what he would describe as 
sheds. A number of the workers had their passports withheld by factory management, 
which is a classic example of modern slave labor. Moreover, the reporter found 
garnishing of wages as the wages were higher on the paper than in reality.145 Nike 
investigated the reporter`s claims regarding the Hytex factory, and has commanded 
factory management to give all workers free, immediate and unrestricted access to their 
passports. Workers have been offered reimbursements for garnished wages and all 
workers who wished to go home were provided with return airfare. Nike deemed the 
conditions at the factory as unacceptable, but concluded that this did not qualify as 
trafficking.146 The Hytex incidence shows that the reports from the outside sometimes 
are necessary in large supply chain, and that press can reveal abuses to the benefit of 
the workers. In conclusion to this chapter Nike`s corporate responsibility efforts and 
goal setting have improved quite significantly since the loss of the Kasky lawsuit to 
date. The progress that has occurred through corporate responsibility since the Kasky 
lawsuit is evidence that Nike`s loss in the Court of Law turned out to be instrumental in 
improving Nike`s behavior. The upcoming chapter about wages will show if CSR as an 
idea and a corporate function has been successful in increasing wages at all.   
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         Chapter 5:  
The Potential of CSR to Increase Wages in Factories 
I start chapter 5 by analyzing the contemporary status of wages in Nike factories 
considering factors that contribute to low wages. Then I proceed with an analysis 
of the potential of CSR to increase wages.  There are two important questions in 
this chapter:  First, why does Nike`s Code of Conduct avoid the issue of wages? 
Second, why is Nike unwilling to endorse the demands by globalization activists 
that the company should pay workers a living wage? In answering these questions 
I start with a brief overwiev of the living wage debate, and a brief presentation of 
how the wage issue plays out in reality. Then I present Nike`s position on wages, 
based upon the wage standards of Nike`s Code and how the company sees its 
position. This will be followed by a discussion of how the proper enforcement of 
the wage standards of Nike`s Code of Conduct can increase wages. After I discuss 
Nike`s Code of Conduct I analyze how the pressure for short term profit 
maximization affects wages. With this pressure to increase revenues on a short 
term basis in mind I discuss if there still is a business case that favors a living 
wage in factories. Then I discuss to what extent civil society`s collective attention 
to the wage issue can influence Nike to ensure an increase of wages. Finally, I 
discuss whether Nike`s corporate responsibility vision has a potential to 
contribute to increased wages.  
 
The Living Wage Debate  
The debate about whether companies should endorse the claim by anti sweatshop 
activists to provide for a living wage and what a living wage should constitute has 
been subject to much heated discussion. Investors and executives do not approve 
of the living wage claim on the grounding that wages should be determined 
merely by market forces. Throughout this chapter I want to show that market 
forces are not always sufficient in order to ensure a living wage in factories in 
developing countries. Another argument against the living wage claim is that if 
companies were to provide a living wage, they would have to pay more for the 
products that they buy, meaning that they would have to increase prices, which 
could mean loss of sales and loss of jobs in its supply chain. My stand is that 
should commit to a living wage in factories, even if that would mean increased 
expences and loss of sales. If companies did not cut orders in developing 
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countries due to increases of wages, humans would not lose jobs. As far as the 
question of what constitutes a living wage is concerned, my research will be based 
upon this definition a living wage by Oxfam International:”one which for a full-
time working week (without overtime) would be enough for a family to meet its 
basic needs and allow a small amount for discretionary spending. “147 Play Fair 
2008, an initiative focusing on conditions in factories that produce sportswear and 
shoes for the OlympicGames 2008 makes a valid point: Nike, and initiatives that 
Nike participates in, such as the FLA, should focus on how to increase wages to at 
least meet a range of national living wage estimates. That would be a better 
approach than allowing poverty wages while the debate continues.148 There is 
evidence that wages in Nike factories sometimes fall below such a national range, 
which I discuss in my section below about how the wage issue plays out in reality. 
 
How the Wage Issue Plays out in Reality 
A study conducted by Play Fair 2008 about conditions in factories that produce 
for Nike, among other big sportswear companies, present recent numbers about 
what wages workers are paid. I want to present the numbers that Play Fair 2008 
found through its research. Soccer ball stitchers in Pakistan reportedly receive 
between US$0.57 and US$0.65 for each ball stitched.This rate has not changed in 
six years although the consumer price index rose by 40% over that period. Home 
based soccer ball stichers in Jalandhar, India make $0,35 - 0,88 each ball, 
depending on the type of ball. They stitch 2-4 soccer balls a day, meaning that 
they make 3, 52 a day, at the maximum. This rate has remained unchanged yet 
there is an inflation of 6,7% - 10%.149 In Schenzhen, China, workers in the 
garment industry (including sportswear) make $ 128-200 a month, including 
bonuses for attendance, overtime and production. The local consumer price index 
for food and rent has risen more than 10%.150 Those wages clearly do not provide 
a living wage by the definition by Oxfam International. In chapter 4 I researched 
the issue of excessive overtime in depth. My findings showed that there is a clear 
connection between excessive hours in factories and poverty-level wages. 
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 A point made by Play Fair is that the buyer`s purchasing practices do impact 
wages.151 Nike, as the biggest buyer of the sportswear industry, has the power to 
change purchasing practices, and make sure that such changes result in increased 
wages. Finally, the Maquila Solidarity Network, a women`s and labor rights 
organization points out that yet Nike`s latest corporate responsibility report does 
focus on transparency, Nike remains silent on the issue of wages.152 A 
representative of this organization said that “Nike is placing its faith in increased 
productivity to deliver wage increases, but that's a blind faith at best”153 My 
preceding analysis in this chapter shows that increased productivity does not 
guarantee a living wage.  
         Before I leave the section about how the wage issue plays out in reality, and 
present Nike`s position on wages, I address in brief the relation between wages 
and hour of work. The passage below acknowledges that there is merit in the 
argument that insufficient wages leads to excessive hours as well as the argument 
that young women can raise above poverty by working 14 or even 16 hours days: 
Wages and hours of work are inextricably linked. Some suggest that workers 
are compelled to seek longer hours because their regular wages don’t meet 
their basic needs. Others say workers want longer hours to earn more money 
to save because these are often short term jobs. There is truth in both sides, 
and there are many other factors.154 
 
Nike`s Position on Wages 
The starting point of my treatment of what Nike`s position of wages will be how 
the company`s Code of Conduct addresses the issue of wages:  
(Contractor) certifies that it pays at least the minimum wage, or the prevailing 
industry wage, whichever is higher.155 (Contractor) provides each employee 
with a clear, written accounting for every day period. The contractor provides 
each employee with all legally mandated benefits.156  
 
The meaning of Nike`s wage standards is that Nike requires nothing more of its 
contractors than compliance with local wage laws, and to pay the market wage if 
that happens to be higher than the minimum wage. This qualifies as CSR in that 
Nike has volunteered to add standards about wages in its Code, and to enforce 
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those wage standards. However, it does not represent a proactive approach to 
corporate responsibility. It would be proactive if Nike added a standard that 
required contractors to pay a living wage to its Code.  
         Nike shares the common stand of multinational companies and investors in 
the living wages debate, which is that the legal minimum and prevailing industry 
wage in factories should be accepted as the norm. The quote below describes how 
this position allows poverty-level wages in factories: “Despite several steps 
forward in the effort to eliminate sweatshops, companies have remained silent on 
the issue of wages—accepting the legal minimum and prevailing industry wage as 
the standard, and leaving the vast majority of low wage workers in poverty and 
hunger”157 The passage below shows that Nike`s official stand is that increased 
productivity would be a sufficient measure in order to combat  poverty level 
wages. Although the reasoning below sounds vague the underlying message is 
certainly that Nike rejects the living wage claim. 
We do not support artificial definitions of wages. Our view is linked to the 
understanding that wages are set, in most cases, by markets, and that markets 
tend to increase wages in those places where productivity is increasing. We 
look to ways of increasing productivity over the long term. If wages are to be 
set by non-market mechanisms, we believe they should be set by those with 
the power to do so on a broad scale, including governments, industrial 
relations bodies (through collective bargaining) and employers’ federations.158 
 
Furthermore, like most other multinational companies, Nike rejects the living 
wage claim on the grounding that the company could lose sales due to increased 
prices, and that this could mean loss of jobs in its supply chain. I described this 
argument in the section about the living wage debate. I want to counter this 
argument to refuse to commit to paying a living wage with referring to findings of 
research about consumer behavior that I discussed in my chapter about civil 
society’s reactions to the sweatshop issue. I want to show how those findings can 
be applicable when it comes to the wage issue. Let me recap in brief, the findings 
of psychological experiments indicate that most consumers are willing to pay a 
little bit more for products made under decent conditions. According to surveys 
customers were on average willing to pay 15% more for a item priced $100 under 
the assurance that it was made under good   conditions. 159 This implies that 
consumers would be willing to pay $115 for a pair of Nike sneakers originally 
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priced $100, for a guarantee that the workers were paid a living wage. The 
indication is that Nike could increase prices modestly to fund increased wages in 
factories without losing sales. 
 
How Proper Enforcement of Nike`s Wage Standards Could Increase Wages 
I research non-compliance with Nike`s wage standards, and how this deprives 
workers of the wages they are due according to the Code. This is interesting for 
my study of the wage issue because I want to research what corrective actions 
Nike takes when workers are not paid what they are due according to the Code, 
and how those actions can contribute to increase wages, if only just modestly so.  
The problem of underpayment or non payment of wages is sometimes caused by 
poor tracking systems of wages and sometimes caused by fraudalent management, 
Workers interviewed by Play Fair 2008 described lying to brand auditors as a 
“common practice.” Some of them even reported that they had been coached into 
giving false answers to auditors. Workers who complied and lied to inspectors 
recieved a RMB30 to 60 (US$0.75-1.50) bonus; workers who told the truth were 
fined or fired.160 At the Joyful Long factory, workers described how management 
produced false wage sheets for auditors, with inaccurate and misleading 
information about what workers were paid. Workers also reported a pressure 
about lying to auditors about working hours and wages. One worker told Play Fair 
researchers how she signed two wage record sheets when she received her pay: 
“One wage record sheet stated that I received RMB400 [US$57], which reflected 
the reality. The other wage record sheet stated that I received RMB900 [US$128]. 
That was for the brand auditors.”161 
         I now turn to what Nike has done in order to address this situation. In FY 
2005/06 Nike returned over RMB 6,530 000 in back wages (US $ 900 000) to 
workers in Chinese factories. This back payment of US $ 900 000 serves as an 
indication of a modest progress since it shows that Nike is aware of the problem 
and at least taking some corrective measure. Furthermore, I assume that Nike`s 
goal to implement Human Resource systems in 100% of its focus factories by 
2011 does include better tracking systems for wages. It is my hope that such 
Human Resources systems effectively will combat the non payment or 
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underpayment caused by poor tracking. When it comes to management fraud, 
better tracking should detect manipulation and deliberately misleading 
information about wages, so that fraudalent managers can be held accountable. Of 
course, the above reasoning only goes for focus factories, as they are the only 
factories included by Nike`s Human Resource goal. Nonetheless, if Nike reaches 
its Human Resource goal, and legitimate tracking systems are implemented in all 
focus factories, that could hopefully have a positive effect on the tracking systems 
of subcontracting factories that supply focus factories with parts of Nike shoes 
and apparel. I really hope that Nike will be successful in accomplishing this goal 
 
         How the Pressure for Short Term Profit Maximization Affects Wages 
This section intends to describe how the pressure for short term profit 
maximization is an important and persistent factor that prevents the needed 
increase of wages in factories.  
While many U.S. CEOs are worried about the next three months, our global  
competitors are making long-term investments in their companies and in their 
economies…We’ve created an environment where a company’s long-term 
value and health are all too easily sacrificed at the altar of meaningless short-
term performance.162 
The above passage refers to a phenomena described by Allen White of BSR as 
“market short termism”163, which means that short term profit maximization is 
given higher priority than long term thinking. White reasons that such market 
short-term orientation represents a barrier to the success of CSR because the 
success of CSR depends on a commitment to more long-term ethical values and 
consistent leadership with integrity:   
In its most fundamental sense, CSR is about stewardship, trusteeship and 
inter-generational responsibility. Capital markets are driven by quarterly 
earnings expectations and, increasingly, by pressures from speculative 
financial instruments such as certain classes of hedge funds (in which shares 
of a company may be bought and sold within days). Taken together, this 
discourages companies from managing for the long term.164 
 
What does this have to do with the issue of wages exactly? In order to pay all 
workers a living wage Nike needs to be willing to increase costs of production for 
the long term, which requires leadership for the long haul. In his article White 
compares short-termism with a grasshopper that just bounces and bounces without 
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building something for the long term, while CSR requires building a long term 
foundation, like the ants that build an anthill. Nike needs to be like the ant, not 
like the grasshopper in factories. Nike should show a long-term commitment to 
world-class conditions in factories by paying workers a living wage.  
 
Is there a Business Case that Favors a Living Wage?  
The institutional theory of CSR is grounded in the following assumption about 
responsible corporate behavior:”The imperative of maximizing profit and 
shareholder value is the root cause that may prevent corporations from acting in 
socially responible ways.” 165 How exactly is this imperative to increase profits at 
any price the biggest overall impediment for a living wage in Nike factories? 
Research has failed to consistently prove a direct correlation between corporate 
ethics and profits. That is to say, there are profitable companies with an 
exploitative and abusive record of corporate responsibility. There are companies 
with a sincere ethical foundation that struggle financially. I am not suggesting that 
there are no profitable companies with integrity. Nevertheless, I want to show that 
CSR as a function may not automatically increase a company`s bottom line. What 
is the implication of this? Even if Nike does see an overall business case for CSR, 
increasing wages in factories to the level of a living wage would be a business 
expence that may or may not result in increased profits. Hence, Nike is not 
inclined to see a business case in favor of paying a living wage in contract 
factories.  
         Let us take a look at findings about the correlation between corporate ethics 
and corporate responsibility. The professor Arieh A Ullmann analyses this 
correlation in the article Data in search of a theory: A critical examination of the 
relationships among social performance, social disclosure and economic 
performance of U.S. firms.166 In 1985 Ullmann pointed out that studies about 
whether social behavior affects financial performance had yet to produce 
consistent findings. Ullmann lists three main reasons for those inconsistencies: a 
lack in theory, inappropriate definitions of key terms and finally deficiences in the 
empirical data bases currently available. However, even if those reasons were to 
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be corrected, it is still not certain that there would be any consistent findings at 
all. Corporate behavior ranges from excellent to extremely bad. There are 
profitable and unprofitable companies at both sides of the scale. Then how is it    
possible to prove a consistent link between ethical behavior and profitability? 
Unfortunately, my research to this point gives indication that the more compelling 
case is for a link between unethical behavior and profit in the area of wages. I am 
not saying that there is no business case for CSR. Most companies do have Codes 
of Conduct, which shows that corporations are usually inclined to see a PR case 
for corporate responsibility. However, a PR case for CSR is insufficient to ensure 
all workers in factories a living wage.    
         I would like to draw on the article Stakeholder influence capacity and the 
variability of financial returns to corporate social responsibility167 by Michael L 
Barnett. The author reasons that although “we have yet to amply demonstrate the 
financial merits of CSR”168 research about CSR and profitability should consider 
the influence capacity of stakeholders. His research draws on stakeholder theory, 
which to date has been the main foundation in order to propose a correlation 
between corporate responsibility and financial performance. The implication is 
that if there is any chance of such a correlation, the strongest (most powerful) 
stakeholders will be the ones to propose CSR measures that are profitable and 
socially desirable. This does not indicate a business case for a living wage for 
workers sowing Nike sneakers in China or Thailand. Workers in Nike factories 
are stakeholders with little or no influence capacity as far as wages are concerned.  
Stakeholder theory does not offer them much hope as for wages. I have to  
conclude that to date there are no indications of even a modest business case for a  
         living wage in Nike contracted factories.
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Can Civil Society Pressure Influence Nike to Increase Wages? 
The backbone for my research of civil society’s capacity to influence Nike to 
increase wages is society’s collective attention to corporate responsibility. CSR is 
a very timely idea, both in Norway and in the U.S. Corporate responsibility is 
newsworthy because global warming is high on the agenda. What is more, the 
Telenor issue shows that the media indeed takes interest in labor scandals.  
Below the CEO of Business for Social Responsibility, Aron Cramer, describes 
how timely corporate responsibility is: ”The world is seemingly paying more attention 
to corporate responsibility than at any time in recent memory. It is our collective 
challenge to capture this opportunity.” 150 The world certainly pays attention to the 
wage issue in Nike factories. The Play Fair 2008 campaign, which aims to 
improve working conditions in the supply chains of the companies in the 
sportswear industry, is evidence of that. But is this attention enough when Nike is 
not willing to make a clear, unconditional commitment to even increase wages 
modestly? What I want to find out is if society’s attention to the wage issue at 
least can give Nike an incentive to increase wages by finding ways to increase 
productivity. In that case, Nike will not make an explicit commitment to pay a 
living wage, but increase wages through increased productivity in order to boost 
the bottom line and silence critics. Can civil society’s moral motives behind 
pushing for a living wage influence Nike to at least increase wages modestly, 
although Nike will not endorse the living wage claim? That is what the remainder 
of my analysis about whether specific factors can increase wages aims to find an 
answer to.  
         Moreover, the institutional theory of CSR assumes that public scrutiny will 
make companies more inclined to act in ethical ways.151 Nike is one of the world’s 
most visible companies. The search word “Nike” showed whopping 142 000 000 
hits on Google.152  In New York Times` article archive there are 4,715 articles 
about Nike since 1981.153 My research in previous chapters has shown that the 
social progress that has taken place in Nike`s factory base to date has been the 
result of public scrutiny by the press and the anti-Nike movement. 
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Although there is no business case for a living wage, the rest of this chapter will 
assume that Nike may be willing to increase wages modestly as a result of public 
scrutiny. There is a certain difference between having a business interest in wage 
increases and increasing wages as a result of public pressure. The former 
represents a positive motivation; the company wants to increase wages because its 
executives believe that will be good for business. The latter represents a negative 
motivation; the company does certainly not increase wages because it wants to, 
but solely because it has been under heavy pressure to do that. My analysis below 
about Nike`s corporate responsibility vision will analyze if this vision has a 
possibility to increase wages, not because Nike will embrace the living wage 
claim, but because it represents a greater willingness to invest in workers. 
 
Can Nike`s Corporate Responsibility Vision Increase Wages?       
 
Nike`s latest corporate responsibility report describes a comprehensive vision for 
how Nike believes good corporate responsibility practice looks like in the 
factories of Nike`s supply chain and in the industry as large.154 As an assessment 
of Nike`s ability to make an impact on society Nike makes a separation between 
where the company “has direct control over change as opposed to the ability only 
to influence change.”155 Nike`s vision states that “An internal marketplace builds 
up where business is flowing to best-of-class suppliers because of their price, 
quality, on-time delivery and corporate responsibility.156 Worker is invested in, 
providing stability and economic opportunity.”157 I interpret the second sentence 
of Nike`s corporate responsibility vision above as a promise that workers be 
invested in. This final section of my chapter about CSR and the wage issue will 
research to what extent, if any, this promise may contribute to increase wages 
even slightly when needed. In its first corporate responsibility report Nike reasons 
that: “Benefits also matter a great deal. More than a quarter of Nike contract 
workers worldwide, for example, are provided free housing by their factories. 
Many more are provided free or subsidized food and other benefits.  
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Many have access to free clinics.”158 I cannot deny that workers who are provided 
free housing and free or subsidized food may be able to save some money for 
parents, siblings or a future education. But, wouldn’t it be better if workers had to 
provide their own food, pay their own rent, and were paid enough to support their 
legitimate needs and save some money? Wouldn’t that give workers greater 
dignity and freedom? My position is that Nike should pay a wage which, 
excluding benefits allows women in factories to be self sufficient and raise above 
poverty. From this position, I will only look into whether wages excluding 
benefits have increased at all.  
         In Nike’s latest corporate responsibility report Nike writes favorably about 
the concept of lean production, which is: “a philosophy of delivering the most 
value to the customer while consuming the fewest resources.”159 Lean production 
relates to wages as Nike believes that “lean holds great promise for worker 
empowerment and the ability to build a higher-skilled, higher paid workforce.”160 
Nike`s goal is to have 90% of its footwear come from lean production lines by the 
end of FY11.161 Currently, lean production is Nike`s primary means of increasing 
productivity, and hence wages, in factories. I want to look into if lean productivity 
is as effective in increasing wages as Nike presents it to be in improving working 
conditions, and increasing wages:  
         In a case study of two Mexican garment factories Richard Locke and 
Monica Romis 162 shed light on the potential benefits of lean production. Locke 
and Romis compare two production plants with obvious similarities: Both 
produce items for Nike (and other brands). Nike`s auditing staff has given them 
comparable scores.163 Workers were subject to the same minimum wage.164 In 
both plants they were paid weekly.165 However, there are notable differences: 
Workers in plant A received 21% higher wages than workers in plant B.166 Plant 
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A workers were more satisfied at work than plant B workers. In plant A workers 
participated in production planning, whilst workers in plant B did not. Workers in 
plant A worked 48 hours a week. Overtime was optional. In plant B, workers 
worked over 60 hours a week. Overtime was forced. Although there was union 
representation at both factories, the workers in plant A described a stronger 
worker voice than the workers of plant B.  The findings indicate that lean 
production systems can contribute increase wages.167  This is how the authors of 
the study of the two Mexican plants sum up their findings:”In sum, the differences 
in working conditions between Plants A and B seem to be the product not of 
geographic location, product mix, or nationality of ownership but instead the 
result of very different ways that work is organized.”168  
         But is there legitimate evidence that lean production systems consistently 
increase wages? Play Fair `s research of factories in China shows that overtime 
sometimes has decreased through lean production methods. A problem that Play 
Fair points out, however, is that workers often face additional stress because they 
are expected to produce the same quotas, in a shorter time. A common pattern was 
that because many workers made smaller production bonuses because they could 
not meet the quotas in shorter time. Skilled workers who used to make production 
bonuses of RMB 400-500 (US$ 50-71) a month were reported to receive RMB 
100-200 (US$ 14-28) in bonuses a month. Play Fair found this to be a common  
pattern in most of the Chinese factories studied in its report.169 The study of the 
two Mexican factories makes a cautionary remark that lean production is not a 
cure all for improved working conditions and increased wages (next page): 
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Yet we should be careful not to conflate particular production systems (lean 
versus modular) with differences in workplace conditions. Although lean 
production lends itself to various human resource practices (increased training, 
autonomous work teams, etc.) there is no automatic link between this system of 
work organization and better working conditions. Yet we should be careful not 
to conflate particular production systems (lean versus modular) with differences 
in workplace conditions. 169 
  
         Conclusion 
There is no evidence of a general trend that wages have increased overall in 
Nike`s factory base thanks to CSR. That is because Nike accepts the legal 
minimum wage and the prevailing industry wage as the basis of wages in factories 
and will not provide a living wage. In this key respect, short term profit 
maximization has the upper hand in the area of wages exactly. Further, the fact 
that there does not seem to be a business case in favor of a living wage as far as 
Nike is concerned strengthens the case for buying practices that sometimes keep 
wages at poverty-level. However, Nike`s monitoring initiatives, and better 
tracking systems for wages through tailored Human Resource management in 
focus factories, will be effective in addressing underpayment or non-payment of 
wages according to Nike`s wage standards. There is some indication that lean 
production systems, as I analyzed above, can contribute to increased wages in 
some factories. Although my research argues that increased productivity is not a 
cure all for higher wages, it can only be welcomed that Nike looks for ways to 
increase wages through improved productivity and better worker treatment. 
Finally, I conclude that as my treatment of the wage issue shows certain signs of 
improvement when it comes to the issue that has been the Achilles heel of CSR in 
factories, this shows that social progress through CSR is worth fighting for, 
although substantial and positive change can be a hard won achievement.  
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         Chapter 6 
         To What Extent is Monitoring Effective as a CSR Measure? 
 
Monitoring is the sweatshop opponents` great hope170 
In this chapter I research the potential of monitoring as a means to improve 
working conditions in Nike factories. How much faith should those of us who 
endorse corporate responsibility and strongly reject sweatshops have in the ability 
of monitoring to contribute to needed improvements in Nike factories? I want to 
analyse the effects to date of the different kinds of monitoring that Nike contract 
factories have been subject to. I will investigate the effects of past and current 
monitoring initiatives. This discussion will start with an analysis of monitoring by 
Nike personell. Then I will put the searchlight on independent monitoring by 
NGOs that have had or have collaboration with Nike. In my discussion of the 
relation between monitoring and the wage issue in chapter 5, we saw that 
monitoring may also refer to public scrutiny.171 Therefore I will discuss the 
effects of public scrutiny by the press, and then turn to scrutiny through activist 
pressure. The final issue I will discuss, as for the effect of different kinds of 
monitoring in the past, is the Kasky lawsuit. After this discussion of issues I will 
make an attempt to answer what kind of monitoring that has proven most 
effective in improving factory conditions. Finally, I review the potential of 
monitoring to improve factory conditions in the future.  
         My theoretical foundation will be John Campbell`s proposition that 
independent monitoring of corporate behavior makes companies more likely to 
behave responsibly.172 I will also draw proposition 2a of the multilevel theory, 
which assumes that the motives of actors within companies and those of outsider 
actors together will push for change through CSR.173 I want to elaborate on the 
assumption of the multilevel theory that there is a hierarchical order of motives, 
with instrumental profit motives on top within companies, and moral, idealist 
motives from the grassroots as the most important driving force of civil society.174 
Can the motives of NGOs, or the press, continue to push for betterment in Nike 
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factories through their monitoring? Will Nike`s instrumental motives make them 
inclined to use information collected through monitoring to actually improve 
conditions? 
         The authors of Can labor standards improve under globalization makes a 
separation between two kinds of groups that investigate labor conditions in global 
supply chains: The first group is the “vigilantes”, who are self-appointed activists 
that focus on the rights of the workers in factories. Examples of vigilante activists 
are Corporate Watch and the National Labor Committee. The second sort is the 
verifiers, who officially monitor the enforcement of companies` standards. 
Examples of verifiers are Nike`s compliance crew and the Fair Labor Assiciation, 
which Nike hired to monitor factories.175 Campbell`s proposition about 
monitoring happens to include the work of the vigigilantes as well as the verifiers. 
My research has shown that social betterment in Nike’s factory base through CSR 
has been the result of the efforts of the “vigilantes” of the anti Nike movement 
and the press. In this chapter I want to research if the official monitoring that has 
been conducted by the verifiers has been successful in contribution to progress 
and improvement in factories.  
 
The Effects of the Different Kinds of Past and Current Monitoring Initiatives 
Before I start my analysis I first recap from chapter 4 what kind of official 
monitoring that has taken place in Nike factories. Second, I want to give a more 
detailed description of the current official monitoring than I did when I described 
Nike’s monitoring in brief in my analysis of Nike`s CSR strategy. First, Nike 
applied the SHAPE inspection in 1997, which is a basic monitoring tool usually 
performed by field production staff in factories. The goal of it has been to get a 
broad picture of the factory base of Nike`s supply chain.176  The M-(for 
management) audit was introduced in FY 2003 as a system for internal 
monitoring. 46 employees monitor over 80 issues. The typical auditor is a native-
speaking female under the age of 30. 90% of the M-audits are unannounced. The 
purpose of these audits is to uncover problems177 As far as independent 
monitoring is concerned, a research team from the Global Alliance for Workers 
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and Communities asked workers in Indonesia a set of questions about work issues 
and personal development.178 Nike contract factories have been subject to 
independent monitoring from 2003-05 by the FLA (Fair Labor Association), of 
which Nike is a participating company.179 Nike auditing until 2006 focused solely 
on indentifying non-compliance with Nike`s Code of Conduct. Has there been any 
correlation between this identification of non-compliance problems and any sound 
follow-up action to combat problems at all?   
         What kind of monitoring takes place in Nike contract factories today? 
SHAPE assessments are still conducted by contract manufacturers. Nike personell 
conducts a twofold monitoring program, which consists of in-depth environment, 
Safety and Health (ESH) and Management Audification Verification (MAV) 
audits. Nike claims that MAV auditing from 2006 - focuses on finding root causes 
of the following non-compliance issues: work hours, wages/benefits, grievance 
systems and freedom of association.180 Is Nike`s self-proclaimed focus on 
monitoring as a device to find root causes of non-compliance likely to result in 
any betterment of conditions in factories whatsoever? My suggestion is that if 
Nike gains a proper understanding of such root causes that could be more 
successful in contributing to meaningful change in factories than traditional 
monitoring that merely focuses on detecting problems.  
 
Internal Monitoring of Nike Contracted Factories 
In this section I investigate whether or not the monitoring of working conditions 
by Nike’s staff has produced CSR valid results. Has there been any betterment, as 
far as these findings are concerned, because of monitoring? I will discuss Nike`s 
monitoring measures in chronological order. Nike’s first monitoring activities 
starting in 1997 with the SHAPE inspection. In chapter 4 I described the SHAPE 
audits as a monitoring device that focuses on auditing Environment, Safety and 
Health (ESH) practices in factories.  I will move to an assessment of the M-audit, 
as it was introduced in 2003, followed by an analysis of FLA`s auditing. Then I 
discuss Nike’s MVA auditing from 2006 onwards. Finally, I narrow my analysis 
towards the findings of Nike`s Environment, Health and Safety (ESH) auditing.  
                                                 
178 Nike (2001):p.27 Note,  this monitoring was conducted during the summer and fall of 2000, 
179 Nike (2004):p.22, see chapter 4 of my research p.39, (http://www.fairlabor.org/ ) 
180 Nike (2005/06):p.29-30 
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I do believe that is an important safety function as for corporate responsibility in 
Nike`s supply chain of factories. However, there are inherent differences between 
Environment Safety and Health (ESH) and labor as ESH auditing relates to safety 
assessments rather than labor treatment. My masterpaper is about the labor aspect 
of corporate responsibility. 
         Nike`s first CR report in 2001 describes the company’s initial monitoring 
efforts. It is a notable fact that Nike confessed that it did not do monitoring “well 
enough.”181 An excellent example that confirms Nike`s confession is that BBC 
claimed to have proof that a Nike contractor in Cambodia used child labor. Three 
young workers who were filmed admitted that they were under 15. However, the 
Cambodian government claimed that that the three of them were old enough to 
work legally, and they continued to work.182 Clearly Nike had a very poor system 
of compliance with the Code of Conduct when they just began production in a 
country with little and unreliable proof of age. Please note that its headquarters 
certainly did not flag this problem when the deciding to do business with 
contractors in Cambodia. However, after this issue in Cambodia was uncovered 
Nike and locally trained monitors worked with financial auditors. Nike claims that 
each one of 3,800 employee records was reviewed. Workers whose age was 
suspect were interviewed, according to Nike.183 This may indicate that Nike did 
step up efforts against child labor. It seems to me that Nike did improve its 
enforcement of the Code`s ban on child labor, and its monitoring of this issue in 
Cambodia. But there is no reason to believe that Nike did that to be nice. Nike did 
so because they wanted to protect the company against more damaging 
information about child labor from this factory.  
        Nike`s first corporate responsibility report addresses monitoring in Kukdong 
International (herein referred to as Kukdong), a Nike contractor in the state of 
Puebla, Mexico. Workers at Kukdong went so far as to stop work in the first week 
of January, 2001. What was clear is that Nike`s monitoring failed to recognize 
crucial elements of the factory`s labor situation, which included reports of abuse 
and critical questions regarding wage calculations.184 Nike claimed to have 
learned the lesson that: “Monitoring needs to look as much at background, local 
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conditions and systems as at current issues within the factory walls”185 The 
conclusion as for Nike`s monitoring at the time of its first CR report is that Nike’s 
internal monitoring in factories failed to even recognize the most pressing issues 
in factories. I do not have any indication that workers` well being improved 
overall as a result of Nike`s SHAPE audits, in this early phase of Nike`s CSR 
history from 1996 -2001. 
         Below I analyse whether Nike`s SHAPE-auditing might have contributed to 
any positive results at all in factories after Nike`s first corporate responsibility 
report was published. The company’s 2004 report does not provide me with much 
information about the findings of SHAPE audits. The only information found, 
besides my description of this inspection, is statistics about the number of SHAPE 
inspections performed in FY 2004. I would like to briefly review the numbers: 
665 inspections were performed in the area of apparel, 183 in the area of 
equipment and finally 168 in the area of equipment. This is a total of 1,016 
SHAPE audits of the contractors of Nike`s global supply chain. I would say that it 
is a weakness as for transparency that Nike`s 04 report does not enclose or 
address the findings of SHAPE audits. However, Nike`s 05/06 report discloses the 
company`s SHAPE audit tools with the publishing of the report, which is a small 
step in the right direction towards greater transparency.186  I do not have a 
legitimate foundation to argue that the SHAPE audits alone caused any 
improvement in factories. Nevertheless, I argue that the SHAPE audits were a 
first step toward more comprehensive and thorough monitoring in factories. 
Therefore, my upcoming analysis will seek to examine if there is a positive 
correlation between the SHAPE audits and the introduction and development of 
the M-audits, from 2003 until today. I investigate if there is such a positive 
correlation, and if this correlation been helpful in creating any improvements in 
factories. 
        Nike established the M-audit in the second phase of its corporate 
responsibility history as an elaborate means to uncover problems. With this 
perspective I can analyse whether the uncovering of problems provided by M-
audits have been or is currently helpful in correcting problems in factories. Let me 
start by showing some facts about M-audits at the time Nike`s second Corporate 
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Responsibility report was published: In FY 03 and FY04 a total of 569 M-audits 
were conducted.187 Nike reported the following priority areas as a result of data on 
the most severe issues of non-compliance: freedom of association, harassment, 
abuse and grievance procedures, payment of wages and hours of work.188 In the 
next paragraph, I will show the results of these M-audits. The results will be my 
phramework to discuss if there has been any progress due to the implementation 
and development of M-audits. 
         As for the issue of freedom of association this was prohibited by law in 10-
25% of the M-audited factories. Freedom of association was prohibited due to 
exclusive union agreement in 1-10% of the factories. This freedom was not 
provided when legal in 1-10% of the factories.189 When it comes to harassment 
and abuse grievance systems the results of Nike`s initial M-audits were the 
following: Workers did not trust the grievance process in 25-50% of the audits. 
Workers reported abusive treatment (be it verbal, physical, psychological or 
sexual) in 25-50% of the audits. Finally, confidencial grievance systems were not 
provided in 25-50% of the factories audited.190 Let us recap the findings of these 
initial M-audits regarding hours of work. Work hours were found to exceed Nike 
standards in a staggering 50-100% of the audits. One day off in seven was not 
provided in 25-50% of them. Work hours exceeded legal limits in 25-50% of the 
cases. 10-25% of overtime refusals resulted in penalty, according to M-audits.191 
These are the findings with regards to wages: Overtime rates were found to be 
below legal minimum or the calculation was inaccurate in 10-25% of the audits.  
The wage calculation was inaccurate in 10-25% of the cases. 25-50% of the audits 
found one or more instance of wages below the legal minimum.192 This certainly 
shows that there were systematic problems in Nike`s factory base.        
         A point when discussing these numbers is that not all contractors of Nike`s 
factory base were subject to M-audits. In Fiscal Year 2004 212,760 (the worker 
population of audited factories) out of 652,926 workers in Nike`s total (active and 
inactive) factory base were covered through M-audits, that is less than 1/3 of the 
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factories.193 But if the numbers of non compliance problems were even higher, it 
probably would not have mattered much, as the numbers showed such systematic 
and widespread problems Nike`s compliance rating gives each factory audited a 
rating on a scale from A to D, depending on the factory`s compliance score. Here 
are the results of Nike`s global compliance rating: 15% of the factories recieved 
an A score. 44% recieved a B score. 17% recieved a C score. 8% recieved a D 
score. 16% were unrated factories because of insufficient information and hence 
recieved an E ranking.194 The real numbers of non-compliance for Nike`s entire 
factory base could well have been higher. However, I do not have evidence to 
assume that the factories with the most pressing conditions deliberately were not 
audited because Nike did not want to publish this information. Factories with a C 
or a D rating could probably have been the subject of reports by organisations that 
are critical of Nike. I want to suggest that Nike`s M-auditing of 1/3 of its factory 
chain provided a comprehensive picture of non-compliance problems. It can be 
argued that something good came out of Nike`s initial M-audits. Nike became 
increasingly aware of the scope of problems in factories, and how those problems 
affected workers.  
 
MAV Audit System 
I discuss whether the development of the MAV-audit according to Nike`s last 
corporate responsibility report have produced any CSR-valid results.  
I want to shed light on how much promise the root-cause analysis of Nike`s MAV 
auditing holds, not just for improving conditions for workers in Nike factories, but 
also for the monitoring aspect of CSR as an idea and as a field. Root-cause 
analysis is corporate language for monitoring that is designed to detect the deeper 
causes of non-compliance problems with Nike`s Code of Conduct. Nike`s MAV 
audit focuses its root-cause analysis on the following five areas: hours of work, 
wages, benefits, grievance systems and freedom of association.195 Almost 40% of 
the management audits found that legally mandated benefits were not provided. 
As for grievance systems, employee trust was low or not existing in about 65% of 
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them. They were reported to be ineffective in about 65% of the factories audited 
as well. The numbers for the issue of freedom of association found through these 
audits are not directly enclosed in Nike`s FY05/06 report. However, the 
compliance score of worker/management communication is reported to have 
increased a little from FY04 to FY06. In FY04 the compliance score in this area 
was closer to 65%, and in FY06 it was closer to 70%.196 I want to briefly review 
the results of MAV-audits in 22 focus factories in China: 5 factories received an 
A rating, 6 received a B, 8 recieved a C, and 3 received a D.197 
         What do these numbers imply? The numbers disclosed in Nike`s last 
corporate responsibility report do not indicate a clear progress from the time 
Nike`s second report was published. Although details of the MAV-audits findings 
on freedom of association are not provided, the slight progress from a little over 
65% to close to 70% in the area of worker-management dialogue may indicate a 
positive trend in the area of freedom of association. This clearly is clearly relateed 
to worker-management dialogue. However, it may be too early to tell after only 
two years. As for the results from the 22 Chinese contract factories, the facts that 
5 out of 22 factories recieved an A-ranking, and 6 of them recieved a B-ranking, 
are particularly high numbers compared to the findings I showed from the other 
MAV-audits.198 This high number probably stems from the fact that these were 
contract factories, not just ordinary factories, and hence subject to more attention 
from Nike. I think it is legitimate to say that the root-cause analysis version of the 
M-audits probably presents more accurate information than the initial version. 
The disclosure of non-compliance with the Code found through root-cause 
analysis may represent a progress when it comes to transparency. It can at least be 
a positive sign that the Maquila Solidarity Network, which is one of Nike`s critics 
writes that Nike`s last corporate responsibility report is “strong on 
transparency.”199 In conclusion about M-audits, I believe root-cause analysis 
could potentially hold great promise, if and only if, Nike always shows 
willingness to follow up non-compliance issues with the right corrective action.  
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External Monitoring of Nike Contracted Factories  
“Watchdog groups say that only people outside of the company can win the 
trust of workers and evaluate complaints. ''That is where you get problems that 
won't show up in paper records and interviews with management”200 
There can be little doubt that successful monitoring depends on people who gain 
the workers` confidence. This section about independent monitoring will 
investigate if the monitoring done by independent organisations in Nike 
contracted factories has been more effective than Nike`s internal monitoring.     
Number three, we publicly recognize the need for expanded monitoring, to 
include NGOs, and the need for a summary statement about this monitoring. 
We are not ready to announce how that will be done, but our current guess is 
that it will include a CPA firm, as well as health and social auditing by an 
NGO—one, two, or three. The specifics of this obviously will come sometime 
down the road, but we are working hard to put this into effect.201 
 
The above quote shows what Nike`s founder Phil knight promised regarding 
independent monitoring ten years ago in his speech to the National Press Club.202 
I want to analyze what kind of monitoring by external actors that has taken place 
in Nike contracted factories and the impact of those monitoring efforts since 
Knight’s speech.  
         I start by analyzing why Nike was criticized for hiring consulting 
companies, first PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and then Ernst & Young from 
1994 – 2001, to monitor compliance with the Code in factories.203 The scholar 
Dara O’Rourke investigated PwC`s factory inspections in China and Korea. 
Further, O’Rourke evaluated PwC`s findings for a factory in Indonesia.204 His 
findings were that although PwC inspections detected minor labor violations, they 
actually failed to detect the following severe violations: hazardous chemical use 
and other health and safety problems; barriers to freedom of association and 
collective bargaining, violations of overtime laws and wage laws as well as 
falsified timecards.205 What is more, PwC`s auditing was criticized for a 
management bias as it relied on information provided by management, rather than 
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the workers.206 O’Rourke’s analysis shows that monitoring that is conducted for 
profit may not be reliable. The profit motive gives auditors an incentive not to be 
sufficiently critical of the management and hence the conditions workers face in 
the client’s factory base. In chapter 4 about the development of Nike’s CSR- 
strategy to date I concluded that Andrew Young’s report was a hollow PR 
move.207 The Young report illustrates that auditing for profit does have its flaws 
as a monitoring device. This criticism of for profit monitoring of Nike contractors 
gives a background to discuss to what extent, if any, Nike’s collaboration with the 
Global Alliance for workers and communities represented any progress in the area 
of monitoring. Please see below how the Global Alliance has been described:  
The GA is an initiative that promotes collaboration among private, public and 
not for profit partners. Global brands offer GA the opportunity to work in their 
contract factories overseas, to influence local business practices and to promote 
the concept of corporate social responsibility in developing countries. 208  
Unfortunately at the present time, the Alliance is no longer active. When I 
accessed the website of this initiative, I could not find any information about the 
Alliance209 presenting an obvious problem in my assessment of this initiative., 
The important point, however, is that the Global Alliance has not aimed to actually 
monitor labor standards in Nike factories. The Alliance has been clear about this 
point when labor rights groups asked it about its stand regarding labor violations 
in Nike contracted factories.210 It is a legitimate point that Nike’s cooperation 
with the Global Alliance did not qualify as monitoring in the strict sense of the 
word. What is more, the report Still Waiting for Nike to do it, by Tim Connor of 
the NGO Global Exchange, concludes: “As such Nike cannot claim that the 
Alliance represents involvement by NGOs in its monitoring program.”211  
However, John Campbell’s (the father of the institutional theory), proposition 
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about monitoring addresses monitoring in the wider sense, as in ongoing attention 
to conditions in factories. In this regard it is relevant to discuss Nike’s relationship 
with the Global Alliance. I have found the summary of a case study by the Thai 
Labour Campaign regarding the Global Alliance’s assessment of the Lian Thai 
factory in Thailand.212 I find it confusing to read because it is written in broken 
English by non-native speakers. Nevertheless, it should provide me with some 
legitimate indications. The findings of the case study point out that the most 
critical issues were ignored in the Alliance’s assessment.213  
         But did some workers actually benefit from the assessment process by the 
Global Alliance at all? The most positive change, according to the Thai Labour 
Campaign was that the company owning the Lian Thai factory, for the first time, 
allowed a union to facilitate meeting inside the factory. Otherwise, the Campaign 
described a slight improvement in the relationship between the union and the 
company. However, the union did not accept new workers as members until they 
had passed the initial probation period. The reason for this was fear that new 
members who had not yet passed the probation period would be dismissed. The 
only practical betterment in these five factories according to the Campaign was 
that that the toilet facilities had been improved in one factory. However, the 
company owning the factories refused to follow the request of the workers that 
more toilets be built. Hence, the improvement of those restroom facilities was a 
very limited improvement.214 What does the analysis of the Lian Thai and the four 
other factories imply? My interpretation is that a cooperation that merely puts the 
searchlight on conditions in factories can contribute to very modest 
improvements, in some factories, probably under some circumstances. I do not 
know exactly what the circumstances were in the case of the five Nike contracted 
factories in Thailand. Nevertheless, what turns out to be clear is that a cooperation 
that does not even monitor labor standards, and does not represent NGO 
involvement as such, cannot contribute to the profound and substantial changed 
needed in factories.  
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But has Nike’s participation in the Fair Labor Association (FLA) contributed to 
any betterment? Please read below what the former President Bill Clinton said in 
his endorsement of the Fair Labor Association (FLA) as a coalition of apparel and 
footwear companies, human rights, labor rights, and consumer advocates: 
“Today’s agreement on fighting sweatshop practices is an historic step toward 
reducing sweatshop labor around the world and will give American consumers 
confidence that the clothes they buy are made under decent and humane working 
conditions.”215 With these big words by Mr. Clinton in mind, I would like to 
investigate whether the FLA has been successful in reducing sweatshop labor in 
factories that produce apparel and footwear for Nike.  
         The FLA has a workplace Code of Conduct, which is found on its website. 
This Code contains nine standards regarding forced labor, child labor, harassment 
or abuse, non-discrimination, health and safety, freedom of association and 
collective bargaining, wages and benefits, hours of work and finally overtime 
compensation.216 It is important to understand that the FLA solely has monitored 
compliance with FLA`s Code, not with Nike’s Code. However, the FLA Code is 
very similar to Nike’s initial Code of Conduct, as found in appendix to Andrew 
Young’s report from 1997, in that they overlap in key respects. Nike`s most 
recent Code217 is more comprehensive, and stricter in some respects, that the 
company’s initial Code. I want to compare The FLA Code with Nike’s initial 
code. After this comparison I want to look into whether in Nike, in any way, has 
exceeded FLA`s mandated obligations. Then I want to put the searchlight on 
Nike’s current Code, as this is stricter than its initial Code. I want to research if 
Nike has improved its Code as a result of its FLA membership. My analysis will 
shed light upon whether some conditions actually have improved as a result of 
Nike’s participation in the FLA, and hence as a result of the FLA`s efforts in 
terms of external monitoring. My most important resource will be FLA`s first 
public report which describes the initial efforts made by participating companies 
in implementing the FLA Workplace Code of Conduct.218 
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Nike’s first Code and the FLA Code both contain four standards with an almost 
identical meaning. First, both Codes have a standard against the use of forced 
labor.219 As for the use of child labor, both state that no person shall be hired 
under the age of 15 (or 14 when allowed according to local laws) or the age, at 
which mandatory schooling has ended, whichever is stricter.220 Each Code also 
states that the employer shall provide standards that protect the health and safety 
of the workers.221 Regarding the issue of wages and benefits, both say that 
employers shall pay at least the legal minimum wage or the prevailing industry 
wage, whichever is higher, and provide legally mandated benefits.222 Finally, 
both require that workers be compensated in accordance with local laws for 
overtime.223 These are clear and apparent similarities between the standards of 
the two Codes.  
        Now that I have described the similarities I want to shift my analysis to the 
actual differences. It is notable that the FLA Code is more comprehensive and 
concise than Nike’s Code when it comes to certain labor standards. FLA`s Code 
has specific standards regarding harassment or abuse, non-discrimination as well 
as the freedom of association and collective bargaining.224 Nike’s initial Code did 
not. All it said was:             
         Specifically, Nike seeks partners that share our commitment to the promotion 
           of best practices and continuous improvement in management practices that  
           recognize the dignity of the individual, the rights of free association and  
           collective bargaining and the right to a workplace free of harassment, abuse  
           or corporal punishment.225 
This hardly qualified as a standard because it did not, in itself, commit Nike or 
contractors to enforce non discrimination, respect the dignity of the workers or the 
freedom of association. I would call it a written guideline. In this respect, Nike’s 
participation in the FLA clearly represented a progress, because Nike committed 
to monitor important standards that Nike’s Code certainly did not put teeth 
behind. Another important difference is that FLA`s Code says that “employers 
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shall”, while Nike’s Code says that “contractor certifies”.226 What does this mean 
when it comes to the issue of accountability? This shows that the contractors are 
accountable to Nike for the enforcement of Nike’s Code. The charter of the FLA 
explains how the companies that have joined the FLA are accountable to the 
Association. As a member of the FLA Nike has complied to undertake the 
following voluntary self-regulation according to Standard B of the charter:  
To formally convey the Workplace Code (in the applicable local language) to 
its factories, and applicable licensees, contractors and suppliers, and  
communicate the Applicant’s commitment to comply with the Workplace 
Code to senior officers, managers and employees of both the Company, 
Retailer or Supplier (as the case may be) and its applicable licensees, 
contractors and suppliers. 227 
This means that Nike is accountable to the FLA for communication of the FLA`s 
Code of Conduct in factories. Further, Nike has complied to “adopt, and cause its 
applicable licensees, contractors and suppliers to adopt, the Workplace Code in 
the manufacture of its products”228 and “to implement a system of internal 
monitoring that complies with the monitoring principles”229. The meaning of this 
clearly is that Nike has promised, through its participation in the FLA, to enforce 
and monitor the Code of the FLA. Now that I have clarified what Nike agreed to 
undertake through its membership, I want to investigate to what extent Nike’s 
acceptance of the FLA`s Code represented a progress in factories.  
         Nike’s participation in the FLA did represent a commitment to implement 
the human rights program of the FLA. This means that Nike did comply to fulfil a 
wide range of FLA company obligations. The obligations were as follows: to 
establish clear standards, create an informed workplace, develop an information 
database, establish program to train company monitors, conduct periodic visits 
and audits, provide employees with the opportunity to report non-compliance, 
establish relationships with labor, human rights, religious or other local groups 
and finally establish means of remediation.230  
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I have shown that Nike agreed to FLA codes. Now I present how Nike 
implemented the FLA codes, and how the FLA holds member companies 
responsible for them. When Nike became a member company of the FLA, Nike 
was required to submit a Monitoring Plan to the FLA that specifically described 
Nike`s  programs for internal compliance with the FLA Code.231 Nike has also 
complied to implement an internal compliance program in order to address non-
compliance with the standards of the FLA Code.232 Furthermore, as an FLA 
member Nike has agreed to subject factories to unannounced monitoring visits by 
independent FLA accredited monitors.233 In 2003, FLA monitors conducted 40 
audits of Nike`s factory base.234 It is worth mentioning that Nike arranged training 
on sexual harassment in the workplace for more than 31,000 workers in Vietnam. 
Moreover, machine safety training took place in 6 factories, which involved more 
than 19,200 workers and supervisors. These training initiatives were supported by 
the FLA.235 Overall, my analysis has shown that Nike’s FLA membership did 
represent some betterment through monitoring because this membership marks a 
commitment to self-regulation through the follow up of ethical standards for labor 
treatment in factories.  
  
Kukdong - Internal Corporate Versus External Independent Monitoring 
I want to research to what extent, if at all, Nike has shown a commitment beyond 
what is required by the FLA to take corrective action and improve conditions 
when non-compliance issues have risen. A significant case was the factory owned 
by Kukdong International in Mexico. Kukdong is a Korean company owning 
factories in Mexico, among other countries. The Kukdong incident took place at 
Kukdong`s main factory in Mexico. Therefore I’ll refer to it as the Kukdong 
factory. Let me recap in brief: In the first week of January 2001, workers at 
Kukdong went on strike. This strike was a response to the illegal firing of five 
workers as well as the fact that twenty workers were laid-off because they had 
complained about low wages and rotten food served in the factory cafeteria. A 
tense stand off during the ensuing days resulted in violence and ongoing tension 
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between management and workers. Nike’s compliance staff visited the factory to 
address the situation shortly after the strike. Nike claims to have learned a 
valuable lesson from the Kukdong incident about where to improve its internal 
monitoring.236 I want to research if Nike’s internal monitoring did improve due to 
the lesson learned through the Kukdong incident. My most important resource 
will be a report by the organization Verité237 that was commissioned by Nike to 
conduct independent auditing of the Kukdong factory.  
The Veritè report made specific recommendations about steps that Nike should 
take after the Kukdong incident to improve conditions in the Kukdong factory. 238 
The report suggests specific corrective measures as for the following issues: child 
labor, harassment and abuse, discipline and termination, pregnancy issues, the 
freedom of association and collective bargaining, grievance procedures, the 
freedom of movement, personnel policies, workplace regulations, compensation 
and work hours and finally health and safety.239 This list of issues in pressing and 
urgent need of corrective measures according to the report shows that the 
Kukdong incident during the first days of 2001 was really just the tip of the 
iceberg. The Kukdong factory was subject to very comprehensive monitoring, not 
only by Veritè, but also by a PricewaterhouseCoopers auditor, by Arturo 
Justiniani Alcalde on behalf of the International Labor Rights Fund and finally a 
team from the Workers Rights Consortium.  
         The monitoring situation was a clash between corporate monitoring and 
independent non-profit monitoring, in that the Veritè team as well as the 
representative of the International Labor Rights Fund represented independent 
monitoring and PwC`s auditor.240 The academic David M Boje is critical of for-
profit monitoring. Here is how Boje perceives the role of auditing by for-profit 
                                                 
236 FLA, Toward Improving Workers` Lives, (2001/02): p.54 
237 Veritè is a research organization which claims to provide independent, non-profit socially responsible 
auditing, training and capability building. This organization was established in 1995. 
http://www.verite.org/aboutus/main.html  
Verité report: http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/gc/mp/pdf/nike_verite_report.pdf  
238 Note: the Verité report was a one-off response to the situation at Kuk Dong. Nike has not involved 
Veritè systematically in its monitoring program since. See Still waiting for Nike to do it p.19. This means 
that Veritè`s recommendation that the factory should be subject to an  action plan and re-inspections 
within three months to further monitor conditions and improvements in all areas was not followed. 
See the Veritè (2001): p.19 
239 Veritè (2001): p.3-19 
240 The Kukdong story: when the foxes guard the hen house, by David M.Boje, Grace Ann Rosile, & J.  
Dámaso Miguel Alcantara Carrillo, New Mexico State University, March 25, 2001. 
http://cbae.nmsu.edu/~dboje/AA/kuk_dong_story.htm  
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companies: “Asking a corporation to hire and pay a monitor, who by any other 
name is a consulting firm, is like asking the fox to hire a monitor to guard its hen 
house.”241 My stand is that monitoring should be conducted by non-profit 
organizations, not by consulting companies.  
Boje criticizes the monitoring in the Kuk Dong factory on the grounding that four 
major areas were not covered in previous reports. I want to investigate what 
previous reports did not cover. One of owners of the Kukdong International main 
factory facility Mr. Lee, split off from three other Koreans owners and opened 
approximately ten other factories around the Atlixco province. These factories do 
out-sourced production for the main (Kukdong) factory. Boje claims that this out 
sourcing has probably been kept secret, as none of the monitoring reports have 
mentioned the existence of these factories. Constituencies interviewed told that 
the conditions of Mr. Lee’s factories were alleged to have been significantly 
worse than those of Kukdong International. This was closely related to the fact 
that only the main factory was monitored. Boje concludes that “It does no good to 
monitor one link in the chain, when production and management moves from one 
to the other.”242 
         Second, after Boje`s study, SITEMEX, which is independent union was 
allowed at the main Kukdong factory. However, as this happened, Nike stopped 
renewing orders for campus apparel with the Kukdong factory. The implication is 
that while the workers won their right to have an independent union, Nike, Mr. 
Lee and the other Kukdong owners can shift production contracts to non-union 
factories. According to Boje, that is the regular result of workers` protests and 
organization in Mexico. What is more, there is a very severe addition to previous 
reports: During police action on January 12th, 2001, two pregnant women were 
physically abused with shields, clubs, and fists. Two eye-witnesses claimed that 
the women allegedly lost their unborn babies as a direct result of this abuse. The 
event has not been reported by any newspaper or monitoring report. This claim 
was supported with interview transcript of the eye witnesses. It was even found 
that the two abused women were kept away from the media for about fifteen days, 
so management could keep the situation under control. Boje believes that Nike, 
                                                 
241 Boje, Rosite, Carrillo, When the foxes guard the hen house  
242 Boje, Rosite, Carrillo, When the foxes guard the hen house  
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Reebok, the Kukdong management, and the State Governor of Pueblo have 
liability for the death of two unborn children. However, this accusation has yet to 
be independently verified. Finally, the release of four monitoring reports did put 
significant worldwide pressure on Reebok, Nike, Kukdong International, as well 
as the State and Federal government of Mexico to allow independent union 
activity.  In March, 2001, Boje assumed, based upon a detailed analysis of 
transcripts of interviews, that once the attention of the public was gone, the ability 
of the independent union to continue was questionable. Dr. Boje claims that there 
was little or no protest when Vada Manager of Nike sent him a letter, dated 
October 17, 2001, saying that Nike would not renew orders at the Kukdong 
factory for the time being. 243  
         These findings do raise critical remarks about monitoring in general as a 
CSR function. Boje`s research clearly reveal that the official monitoring that did 
take place at the Kuk Dong missed, or deliberately did not publish, information 
about crucial events at the Kukdong International. However, did renew orders at 
the Kuk Dong (renamed Mex-Mode) in 2002. What Nike claims to have learned 
from the Kuk Dong incident is “remediate, don’t terminate”244, which is the policy 
that FLA participating companies commit to when factory management is willing 
to contribute to corrective action. Remediation is the responsible thing to do, as 
opposed to ceasing orders, and depriving poor women from the best option they 
happen to have. However, it is hypocritical of Nike to say that the company 
learned that correction is more appropriate than a cut and run response, knowing 
that they decided to cease orders in the fall of 2001.245  
         But did something good come out of the Kuk Dong incidence at all when it 
comes to the area of monitoring, despite legitimate critical remarks about the 
monitoring that took place in the aftermath of the Kuk Dong? A New York Times 
columnist, Ginger Thompson labelled the Kuk Dong incident as a success story.246 
Thompson points out that the workers won the right to an independent union. 
More, Thompson claims that Nike officials pushed Kuk Dong managers to abide 
by corporate codes of conduct because the company already had been under fire 
                                                 
243 Boje, Rosite, Carrillo, When the foxes guard the hen house 
244 FLA, Toward Improving Workers` Lives, (2001/02): 54 
245 Boje, Rosite, Carrillo, When the foxes guard the hen house, and my reference to Vada Manager of 
Nike’s letter on the previous page 
246 Ginger Thompson, Mexican labor protest gets results, N.Y.Times, October 8, 2001 
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for harsh conditions in Asia.  According to workers interviewed by Thompson, 
they had received two raises since the Kuk Dong incident, meaning that they 
would make $4.50-$5.00.  
         The Worker Rights Consortium (WRC) has published the findings of its 
assessment of the Mexmode factory conducted through May and June 2008.247 An 
inquiry was launched by the Worker Rights Consortium in response to two 
allegations: that unionized employees had been subject to physical abuse and 
intimidation and that the Mexican government was guilty of unlawful intervention 
in the internal affairs of the factory’s union. Please note that it has not been 
alleged at all that violent and intimidating actions were carried out by factory 
management, or by its request. However, these actions were allegedly carried out 
by supporters of Antorcha Campesina, (in English “Peasants` Torch”), which is a 
political organization with close ties to the Industrial Revolutionary Party (PRI), 
one of Mexico’s main political parties.248 According to the Worker Rights 
Consortium (WRC), Mexmode`s factory management was fully cooperative with 
the investigation. Nonetheless, the findings of the WRC are still of interest 
because it sheds light upon how political interests can collide with workers` 
legitimate rights to union activity. This means that political interests actually can 
get in the way of social betterment in factories, because unions play in important 
role in the development and progress of labor treatment and corporate 
responsibility in factories. These were the findings of the WRC at the Mexmode 
factory: The female Secretary General of the SITEMEX union was physically 
assaulted and dragged out of the factory by members of the local Peasants` Torch 
faction.  Three female union officers, one male union officer and one female 
worker were physically assaulted inside the factory by a male Peasants` Torch 
member. The WRC found unlawful actions by government officials. One senior 
government official led a protest which involved threats of violence after some of 
the workers who participated in the assaults described above had been justifiably 
suspended by factory management.249 
 
                                                 
247 Worker Rights Consortium (WRC) assessment re Mexmode S.A. de CV (Mexico) findings and 
recommendations, July 3, 2008  
http://www.workersrights.org/freports/WRC%20Assessment%20re%20Mexmode.pdf  
248 WRC, Mexmode, (2008): p.2 
249 WRC, Mexmode, (2008): p.8 
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Conclusions 
What do my findings altogether imply for the potential of monitoring as a CSR 
function to improve labor treatment in factories? It is legitimate to say that there is 
a direct correlation between the monitoring that has taken place in Nike factories 
and increased transparency. It is a progress that Nike has published three 
increasingly corporate responsibility reports and one China supplement as a result 
of the findings of the official monitoring that has taken place in Nike factories. 
My conclusion is that the monitoring by the vigilantes that cooperate with Nike 
has been more effective in producing findings that are reliable and dare to be 
critical of Nike. If nothing else, the official monitoring that has taken place in 
Nike contracted factories since Nike established CSR as a function represents a 
massive step forward from the days Nike refused to assume responsibility for 
conditions in its factory base whatsoever. Nike is obviously much more aware of 
problems in factories today than ten years ago. A Code of Conduct with clear and 
concise standards for supply chain management, and hence labor treatment in 
factories, is an absolute necessity for the credibility of CSR as a function. 
Monitoring is necessary for the enforcement of a Code of Conduct, as well for the 
enforcement of corporate responsibility.  
         The relationship between a Code of Conduct and monitoring is that you 
can’t have one without the other. My research has shown that the problem is that 
Nike is not always willing to follow up problems in factories that have been 
detected through comprehensive audits with the necessary actions. For instance, 
Nike has not been willing to combat the problem of excessive overtime with an 
explicit commitment to pay a living wage in factories, so that workers would not 
have to work excessive hours because of the financial pressure of poverty wages. 
Monitoring cannot alone, in itself, produce or contribute to betterment in factories 
without the right corrective actions. The success of monitoring depends on 
leadership with integrity and willingness to make decisions that are unpopular in 
corporate America and the global business community.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
My case study shows that the most important benefit of CSR is that civil society, 
including the CSR community, can sometimes pressure the most visible companies to 
change behavior through acceptance and endorsement of corporate responsibility. 
However, the most important limitation of CSR as a function is that Nike never has 
been willing to unconditionally adapt to responsible corporate behavior in every area of 
labor treatment as Nike will not endorse the legitimate claim to ensure a living wage in 
factories. In its first corporate responsibility report Nike indicates that it would be a bad 
idea to simply double wages, because that could mean fewer Nike units sold, and hence 
fewer jobs.250 Nike’s reasoning provides a key to understand the most pertinent 
limitation of CSR in factories. Nike is only willing to endorse and enact legitimate CSR 
measures as long as the costs of CSR measures do not prevent Nike`s future growth. 
Nike refuses to accept the living wage claim because Nike believes that the costs of it 
would exceed any potential benefits of it. Given that Nike is not willing to enact CSR at 
any cost, short term profit maximization will likely continue to have the upper hand 
when socially responsible behavior collides with the company`s most profitable option. 
The most compelling case may be for unethical behavior. The global market is inclined 
to value short term profit maximization higher than integrity and responsible leadership 
for the long term.  
         What does my reasoning above regarding the conflict between CSR and profit 
maximization tell us about the potential of the triple bottom line of financial, social and 
environmental sustainability? 251 Nike’s refusal to ensure a living wage in factories 
shows that Nike is inclined to choose the hard core financial bottom line if profit 
maximization collides with social sustainability. It is a pity that Nike endorses the 
concept of a triple bottom line and declines the living wage claim when a living wage 
standard in Nike’s leadership Code would be compatible with the triple bottom line and 
its reliance on tangible collection of data.252 It would be possible to support a legitimate 
and feasible definition of what a living wage should include, and have a living wage 
strategy in order to calculate a living wage according to local costs. Furthermore, if 
Nike were to endorse the living wage claim, Nike would have to change its buying 
                                                 
250 Nike (2001): p. 39 
251 I described the idea of a triple bottom line and how Nike claims to endorse this idea of corporate 
responsibility, in the introduction chapter of my master paper I p. 5 and 6.   
252 Chris Mac Donald, Wayne Norman, “Getting to the bottom of “triple bottom line” (pre-publication version 
March 2003) p.1-19, published version found in Journal of Business Ethics Quarterly (2004) page 3 
http://www.businessethics.ca/3bl/triple_bottom_line_abstract.html 
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practices, and hence its business model. Nike’s latest corporate responsibility report 
describes how the company claims to strive to integrate CSR and the triple bottom line 
into its core business model.253 My case study of Nike shows that Nike only is truly 
serious about integrating the triple bottom line of CSR into its labor treatment and core 
business, as long as corporate responsibility will not be detrimental to the company’s 
bottom line on a short term basis. Hence, Nike’s commitment to integrate the triple 
bottom line of CSR may be questionable.  
         My findings about how the limits of corporate responsibility play out in Nike’s 
factory base to a great extent supports left wing criticism that CSR mostly serves the 
purpose of window dressing because Nike clearly will not enact CSR at any cost. Does 
my criticism of Nike debunk the assumption of the multilevel theory of CSR that the 
motives of actors inside the company as well as those of actors outside the company 
together will push for social change and betterment through CSR or is there still some 
merit in it? 254 The findings of my research indicate that Nike’s motives and the motives 
of Nike’s critics will in fact continue to pursue CSR, as long as CSR is not enacted at 
the cost of the bottom line. Under the assumption that Nike’s main motives for CSR are 
instrumental and that civil society’s main motives are moral255, the implication is that 
civil society can only influence Nike to change behavior to the point where Nike has to 
increase prices to pay for corporate responsibility measures.  
         In the New York Times article The paradox as business as do-gooders Joe 
Nocera argues that if companies integrate CSR into their core business models they 
would merely do so because their consumers want them to.256 Further, Notera argues 
that if some companies integrate CSR into their companies` core business model, those 
companies will take those steps as a response to how the values of American 
consuming culture have changed during the last decades. My case study has shown that 
Nike accepted responsibility for conditions in factories and implemented CSR as a 
function because it was forced to conform to the values of its critics that favor corporate 
responsibility in factories. However, if the values of Nike’s critics collide with short 
term maximization of shareholder value, which is the case in the area of wages, it 
seems that Nike will continue to favor the increase of shareholder value. 
                                                 
253 Nike(2005/06): Chapter 5, Workers in contract factories, p. 15-52  
254 Aguilera/Williams, Putting the S back in Corporate Social Responsibility, a multilevel theory of CSR, p. 847 
255 Aguilera/Williams, Putting the S back in Corporate Social Responsibility, a multilevel theory of CSR,  
      p 847 and 848 
256 Joe Nocera, The Paradoxes of Business as Do-Gooders, New York Times, November 11, 2006 
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But to what extent do my findings show that CSR initiatives that are compatible with 
the growth of a company can be successful in improving conditions in factories?257 The 
answers to that question are of importance when it comes to the assumption of the 
institutional theory of CSR that public scrutiny gives companies a stronger incentive to 
behave ethically.258 I have found that the most important progress after Nike accepted 
responsibility for the conditions of its supply chain is improved enforcement of Nike’s 
Code of Conduct. In the second phase of Nike’s corporate responsibility history from 
2001-2004 Nike gained an understanding of widespread and pressing violations of the 
Code through the implementation of Management Audits as a thorough monitoring 
vehicle.259 Further, the Management Audits conducted from 2005 to date that include 
analysis of the root causes of problems represent a certain progress in the development 
of Nike’s CSR measures.260 Those audits indicate willingness to understand the root 
causes of non-compliance problems and to improve the enforcement of Nike’s Code by 
addressing those root causes of problems.  
         Nike is willing to enforce the wage standards of its Code of Conduct. As under 
payment or non-payment of wages has been a significant problem in factories, 
improved compliance with the wage standards in order to ensure that the workers are 
paid what they are due will contribute to increase wages for workers who were not paid 
what they were due in the past. In fiscal year 2005/06 Nike returned over RMB 6,530 
000 in back wages (US $ 900 000) to workers in Chinese factories.261 This shows that 
Nike is aware of the problem, and that the company takes some corrective action. I also 
found that progress toward, and the achievement of Nike’s goal to implement tailored 
Human Resource systems in its focus factories could be effective in addressing 
underpayment or non-payment of wages through improved tracking systems for wages. 
Nike’s goal to eliminate excessive overtime in contract factories by fiscal year 2011 is 
the most important one of the company’s CSR targets.262 I am not certain that Nike will 
accomplish this goal in three years from now. However, Nike would not have set this 
business goal unless the company believed it could achieve it. My research assumes 
that substantial progress in reducing the amount of excessive overtime by 2011 is 
                                                 
257 For the fiscal year ending May 31, 2008, Nike reported revenues of $18,6 billion, an increase of $2,3 billion 
over last year’s endings, see http://www.nikebiz.com/company_overview/facts.html  
258 Campbell, Why would corporations behave in socially responsibly ways? An institutional theory of corporate 
social responsibility, 958. 
259 Nike (2005/06): p. 17/ Nike (2004): p 37-38 
260 Nike (2005/06): p. 21/22 
261 Nike (2005/06): p. 47/Nike, China supplement, (2008):19 
262 Nike (2005/06): p. 16 
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possible. If Nike succeeds in eliminating excessive overtime by 50% or 70% by 2011 
that would be a vast progress from the time Nike gained the knowledge that excessive 
overtime was a major problem through its Management auditing from 2001-2004. My 
analysis of how CSR in Nike’s contract factories show that there has certainly been 
some improvements through CSR. The findings of case study do not paint an entirely 
gloomy picture of how CSR plays out in reality. Finally, I want to remark that Nike has 
become a much more transparent company thanks to CSR as a company function, as 
compared with the company’s level of transparency at the time CSR was established. In 
1997 the report that started the Kasky lawsuit and its findings were kept confidential.263 
On the other hand, in Nike’s latest corporate responsibility report, the findings of 
Nike’s official monitoring since the release of its second corporate responsibility report 
are presented and accessible to the public. This certainly represents progress when it 
comes to transparency. 
         Finally, I want to show some numbers that give strong indication that labor will 
continue to be an important area for the development of CSR ideationally and as a business 
function. In the New York Times article Corporate conscience survey says workers should 
come first Stephanie Strom discusses the answers of a survey by the National Consumers 
League and a public relations company.264 800 adults interviewed for the survey were asked 
to identify Corporate Social Responsibility. 27% of them defined it as “a demonstrated 
commitment to the well-being of employees.”265 This indicates that companies, including 
Nike, cannot afford to ignore the labor area of CSR in the future if they want to be taken 
seriously and respected for their corporate responsibility practices. Although I have concluded 
that profit maximization is likely to have the upper hand if bad behavior pays more than 
corporate responsibility on a short term basis, my findings show a mixed picture of the 
possibilities of corporate responsibility to create substantial betterment. Nike is a young 
company. CSR is a new function in the company. Profound change does take time.  
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Appendix  
My Interview with Marc Kasky, San Francisco, October, 12, 2007 
What do you believe were the lies in Nike`s PR campaign related to labor treatment prior 
to the Kasky lawsuit? 
In 1997 Nike was aware of sweatshop criticism and anti globalisation activists, Nike`s 
Code of conduct required compensation, safety, no punishment or forced overtime, from 
subcontractors. Nike claimed that subcontractors enforced them, and that Nike was a 
“model corporate citizen.” Nike hired a management firm to go to Southeast Asia, the 
report came back, but Nike did not release it. A Nike employee saw the report, and 
released it to the New York Times. California has a statute regarding false marketing and 
unfair business practices. Marc Kasky had the legal status of a private attorney general as 
he sued on the behalf of the people in California. Corporations did not have the same 
protection as human being, in a discussion you could not sue them for information in paid 
advertisements, press releases, letters to athletic departments etc, prior to the Kasky 
Lawsuit. California Supreme Court ruled that people can sue corporations on the grounds 
of factually false statements (commercial speech) that are made to sell products, even if 
it’s not paid advertisement. The verdict of the California Supreme Court blurred the line 
between commercial speech and private/political speech was. Nike lost 6-3, the US 
Supreme Court decided not to overturn the California verdict. This applies to any 
company doing business in California. They can’t be careless of facts! 
 
If Nike lied, how did Nike manipulate information to the public prior to the Kasky 
lawsuit? The company did not change what they were saying. The company finally argued 
that it did not matter if it lied because it was protected speech 
 
Can Nike be trusted to present more truthful information after Kasky since it is possible to 
file a lawsuit against Nike on the grounding of deliberately false information to the 
public? Yes, they have to tell the truth, or they can lose in Court 
 
Do you believe that there may have been improvements in Nike`s treatment of workers in 
factories after the Kasky lawsuit, due to fear of damaging lawsuits? 
Nike published a press release 2005: they realised that they were mistaken and needed to 
improve conditions in Indonesia, be more careful with facts, influenced the manufacturing 
of products, successful asserting truthfulness, The lawsuit was about truthfulness with 
your customers, discouraging misrepresentation! Corporate communications is made more 
leverage, checking truthfulness.  
 
Are there any practical alternative information strategies that NGOs, the press, the anti-
Nike movement could pursue that actually would improve labor treatment in Nike`s 
factories? Attacking Nike created an “us vs. them”, which perpetuates more of what you 
don`t want. Civil society should correct Nike`s behavior when needed, not punish the 
company. My effort affecting the business practices of California. I wanted the people of 
California to be entitled to know the truth about Nike`s labor practices. My message is to 
tell the truth and live by what you believe in! 
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